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NOTICE AND THE NEW DEAL
MILA SOHONI†
ABSTRACT
The New Deal Supreme Court revised a well-known set of
constitutional doctrines. Legal scholarship has principally focused on
the changes that occurred in three areas—federalism, delegation, and
economic liberty. This Article identifies a new and important fourth
element of New Deal constitutionalism: a change in the constitutional
doctrine of due process notice, the doctrine that specifies the
minimum standards for constitutionally adequate notice of the law.
The law of due process notice—which includes the doctrines of
vagueness, retroactivity, and the rule of lenity—evolved dramatically
over the course of the New Deal to permit lesser clarity and to tolerate
more retroactivity. The upshot has been the near-total elimination of
successful notice-based challenges other than in the limited context of
First Amendment vagueness attacks.
Unlike the more famous doctrinal changes of this period, changes
to due process notice doctrine were not obviously necessary to
accommodate the New Deal legislative agenda, either as a matter of
jurisprudence or as a matter of politics. Due process notice doctrine
nonetheless underwent a radical transformation in this era, as the
Court came to regard its broader shift toward deferring to legislative
and executive policy decisions as requiring the relaxation of due
process notice doctrine. The link forged between deference and notice
had significant functional effects on the most important audience for
the Court’s notice jurisprudence—Congress. By loosening the
strictures of due process notice doctrine, the Court lowered sharply
the enactment costs of federal legislation and thereby facilitated its
proliferation. This is a distinct, and hitherto unacknowledged,
mechanism by which the Court in this period enhanced national
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power and encouraged the flourishing of the emerging administrative
state.
Like much of the New Deal “settlement,” the New Deal
reformulation of due process notice doctrine is today the subject of
ferment in the courts. Recognizing the New Deal roots of due process
notice doctrine is critical for understanding these ongoing judicial
debates—and for beginning the conceptual work of mapping the
future shape of this vital cluster of doctrines.
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INTRODUCTION
It is an oft-told tale. In the latter half of the 1930s, with the
country in the grip of the Great Depression, the Supreme Court
reversed course on three constitutional issues of vital significance to
President Roosevelt’s legislative agenda for economic recovery. The
1
Court abandoned the doctrine of liberty of contract, it approved
2
congressional delegations to federal regulatory agencies, and it
embraced an expansive view of Congress’s legislative powers under

1. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 406 (1937).
2. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 (1989) (“Until 1935, this Court never
struck down a challenged statute on delegation grounds. After invalidating in 1935 two statutes
as excessive delegations, we have upheld, again without deviation, Congress’ ability to delegate
power under broad standards.” (citations omitted)).
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Article I. By thus reformulating the rights of individuals, of the
federal government, and of the states, New Deal constitutionalism
upended the existing architecture of American government and laid
the groundwork for the subsequent flourishing of the administrative
4
state.
On the list of doctrinal changes that make up New Deal
constitutionalism, the most famous entries are the revisions to the
5
doctrines of economic due process, delegation, and federalism. A
longer version of the list espoused by some scholars also includes the
6
New Deal Court’s emerging solicitude for civil and political rights, its
7
approval of augmented presidential powers over foreign affairs, and
8
its shifting treatment of common-law sources. But another significant
change that also occurred in this period has gone unremarked by
courts and commentators: a transformation in the constitutional law
of due process notice.

3. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) (“The power of Congress over
interstate commerce ‘is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution.’” (quoting Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824))); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
36–37 (1937) (“The fundamental principle is that the power to regulate commerce is the power
to enact ‘all appropriate legislation’ for its ‘protection and advancement’ . . . .” (quoting The
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 564 (1870))).
4. See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48
STAN. L. REV. 247, 253 (1996) (calling the New Deal a “substantial reformation of the original
constitutional structure above all because it refashioned the three basic cornerstones of that
structure: federalism, checks and balances, and individual rights”).
5. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 64 (1991) (“After Roosevelt’s court-packing threat, the Supreme
Court retreated from its former role as the guardian of economic liberty. Economic regulations
were given a very strong presumption of validity . . . .”); id. at 73–74 (“Before the New Deal, the
commerce clause was given a relatively narrow reading. . . . Since 1937, the scope of
congressional power under the commerce clause has steadily expanded.”); id. at 78–79 (“In its
abortive attack on the New Deal, one of the instruments used by the Court was the delegation
doctrine. . . . The Court quickly retreated from the rigidity of the 1935 cases.”); G. EDWARD
WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 3 (2000) (describing the “standard areas” of
New Deal constitutionalism); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101
HARV. L. REV. 421, 421–22, 425 (1987) (discussing “three aspects of New Deal
constitutionalism: the rejection of the original constitutional commitment to checks and
balances in favor of independent and insulated regulatory administration, the recognition of
substantive entitlements beyond those protected at common law, and the abandonment of
principles of federalism that vested regulatory authority in both the federal government and the
state”).
6. Barry Cushman, The Great Depression and the New Deal, in 3 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY
OF LAW IN AMERICA 268, 309 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).
7. Id. at 283.
8. WHITE, supra note 5, at 3.
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Due process notice doctrine addresses a simple, core question:
What degree of notice of the law is constitutionally required? This
issue has recently received attention in the context of vagueness
challenges and in immigration cases addressing the retroactive effects
9
of legislative amendments. All areas of law, however, rest upon the
predicate assumption that some constitutionally adequate notice
10
exists. The doctrine is the constitutional expression of the Anglo11
American view that secret law is the essence of tyranny.
This Article takes as its vantage point the doctrine of due process
notice and recounts the story of New Deal constitutional change from
this vantage point. Adopting this perspective brings into view several
important and linked doctrinal developments that have, until now,
remained either obscure or unconnected. Vagueness doctrine,
retroactivity, and the key methods of statutory interpretation that
12
relate to due process notice all changed during this period, and they
all changed in the same way: to permit less clarity and predictability
in the law.

9. See Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1483–84 (2012); Skilling v. United States, 130 S.
Ct. 2896, 2925 (2010).
10. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (“A fundamental
principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice
of conduct that is forbidden or required. . . . This requirement of clarity in regulation is essential
to the protections provided by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” (citations
omitted)).
11. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (1964) (explaining that a secret law does
“not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not properly called a
legal system at all”). Jeremy Bentham, who not coincidentally invented the word “codification,”
supplied a famous exposition of this concept: “[W]e have never heard of any tyrant in such sort
cruel, as to punish men for disobedience to laws or orders which he had kept them from the
knowledge of.” 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, Justice and Codification Petitions, in THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 437, 547 (John Bowring ed., 1962); see also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91, 96 (1945) (referring to “the practice of Caligula who ‘published the law, but it was written in
a very small hand, and posted up in a corner, so that no one could make a copy of it’” (quoting
SUETONIUS, LIVES OF THE TWELVE CAESARS 278 (121))); Kenneth C. Davis, The Information
Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 779, 797 (1967) (calling secret law “an
abomination” and “forbidden”).
12. “[T]he New Deal was not an altogether sudden break; it should instead be understood
as the culmination of a set of ideas with much earlier foundations.” Sunstein, supra note 5, at
422 n.1. The full flowering of many of these ideas only occurred in the 1940s. See WHITE, supra
note 5, at 165 (noting that “contemporaries in the 1940s remarked on the unusual magnitude of
changes that were taking place” in Commerce Clause, due process, Contracts Clause, and
separation-of-powers doctrines). Accordingly, this Article treats the New Deal era as
encompassing the period between the early 1930s and the mid-1940s. This approach typifies
much scholarship on New Deal constitutional change, both by historians and by legal scholars.
See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 5, at 199; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 438.
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Interestingly—and perhaps surprisingly, considering the wealth
13
of scholarship on the era—this insight is novel. Consider one muchdiscussed aspect of constitutional due process notice doctrine: the
doctrine of vagueness. In prominent accounts of New Deal
14
constitutionalism, vagueness doctrine makes little or no appearance.
Conversely, scholars writing about vagueness do not give prominence
15
to how the doctrine evolved in the New Deal era. Yet it was in the
New Deal era that key elements of modern vagueness doctrine were
developed.
Three important aspects of the modern law of vagueness were
settled during the New Deal period. First, the Court tightened its
standards for sustaining facial vagueness challenges to laws outside
16
the First Amendment context. Second, it started to treat civil
economic laws as categorically subject to relaxed scrutiny for
17
vagueness. Third, with respect to criminal laws, the Court adopted
the practice of treating mens rea requirements as a substitute for
18
clarity in legislative language.
Viewed separately or in combination, these principles worked a
considerable change in the substance and procedure of vagueness
challenges. But the notice jurisprudence of this period did more than
merely transform vagueness. The Court changed its treatment of the
rules pertaining to retroactivity, another doctrine that serves values of

13. Cf. Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82
CALIF. L. REV. 491, 502–03 (1994). Professor Post’s article examines how one pre-New Deal
vagueness decision revealed the Supreme Court’s political proclivities at the time—in his
characteristically vivid phrase, “the subterranean paths through which the ideological
perspective that dominated the Court during the 1920s exercised its influence.” Id. at 502. Put in
these terms, the aim of this Article is to show how the New Deal Supreme Court dug up and
repaved those “subterranean paths” as its ideological perspective altered over the span of the
New Deal.
14. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 5; Cushman, supra note 6; Sunstein, supra note 5.
15. See, e.g., Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279 (2003); Cristina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness:
Suggested Revisions to the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J.
255, 268 (2010). The chief exception is the seminal fifty-year-old student note by Professor
Anthony Amsterdam. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960). Professor Amsterdam supported his view of
the role of the vagueness doctrine as “chiefly an instrument of buffer-zone protection” by citing
“the very pattern of incidence of the void-for-vagueness cases, first in the sphere of economics
at a time when economics was the sphere where the Court rode tightest rein on legislative
innovation, and today in the now most critical field of free expression.” Id. at 84–85.
16. See infra Part II.A.1.
17. See infra Part II.A.2.
18. See infra Part II.A.3.
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fair warning and notice. Shifts of comparable heft occurred in the
Court’s application of the rule of lenity, a canon of statutory
20
construction that likewise implicates notice. In sum, while it
famously used one aspect of vagueness doctrine to build a “buffer
zone” of protection around the exercise of certain individual
21
liberties, the Court in this era also—less famously but no less
critically—used the bulk of due process notice doctrine to create a
“buffer zone” that would shield the exercise of government power
from challenge by regulated individuals.
This reformulation of due process notice jurisprudence presents
a puzzle. If the legislative agenda of the New Deal was going to go
forward, certain changes in constitutional doctrine were inevitable.
There had to be increased national power under the Commerce
Clause. There had to be a generous understanding of congressional
power to delegate. There had to be an erosion of constitutional
protections for liberty of contract. In contrast, changes to due process
notice doctrine have no self-evident connection to the fulfillment of
the New Deal’s institutional program.
Why, then, did due process notice doctrine change in this period?
The timing of these doctrinal changes was not a coincidence. The
Court’s opinions reveal that the Justices debated how due process
notice doctrine should be altered and ultimately came to embrace the
view that a relaxed due process notice was a necessary component of
the Court’s larger project of establishing judicial deference to the
political branches on matters of economic and social policy.
The forging of this link between notice and deference had
notable consequences. By relaxing the constraints of due process
notice doctrine, the Court sharply lowered the costs of enacting
federal legislation and thus facilitated its proliferation. By thus
boosting Congress’s lawmaking capacity, the Court’s reformulation of
due process notice doctrine helped to pour the foundation upon
which its coequal branches would build the modern regulatory state.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the main
features of due process notice doctrine. Part II recounts how the

19. See infra Part II.B.
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. See Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 75 (“The primary thesis advanced here is that the
doctrine of unconstitutional indefiniteness has been used by the Supreme Court almost
invariably for the creation of an insulating buffer zone of added protection at the peripheries of
several of the Bill of Rights freedoms.”).
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Court altered central aspects of this doctrine during the New Deal in
a manner that permitted less clarity in legislative language and
became more tolerant of retroactive changes in legislative language.
Part III sets out opinions that reflect the Court’s rationale for these
changes and then discusses the functional effects of the Court’s
reformulation of due process notice doctrine on the enactment costs
of federal legislation. Part IV explains that the New Deal
reformulation of due process notice, like much of the New Deal
“settlement,” is today under pressure. In several noteworthy recent
opinions, and in both criminal and civil contexts, the Supreme Court
has rejoined battles over the bounds of notice doctrine fought during
the New Deal. Interestingly, many of these opinions share a common
feature: they concern confusing federal statutes and complex federal
regulatory schemes, and the judicial demand for better notice appears
to flow from the perception that statutory and regulatory complexity
poses a threat to the values of notice. As these new considerations of
legal complexity draw modern judges to reassess the protections
necessary to secure adequate notice, the buffer zone of deference
erected during the New Deal is showing signs of fragility. For the
second time in a century, due process notice is in play as a tool for
restraining the scope and reach of federal law.
I. THE FACETS OF DUE PROCESS NOTICE DOCTRINE
The most familiar aspect of the modern conception of due
process notice is vagueness doctrine. To quote the conventional
formulation of this rule, vagueness doctrine “bars enforcement of ‘a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
22
meaning and differ as to its application.’” “Vagueness doctrine is an
outgrowth not of the First Amendment, but of the Due Process
23
Clause of the Fifth Amendment,” and it thus applies to all laws, not
24
merely those affecting expressive activity.
Vague laws imperil two important values. First, vague laws are
hard to follow and threaten to trap the innocent: “[B]ecause we
assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct,
we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a
22. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr.
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
23. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).
24. Id.
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reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
25
Second, vague laws permit arbitrary and
accordingly.”
discriminatory enforcement: “A vague law impermissibly delegates
basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on
an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary
26
and discriminatory application.”
Application of modern vagueness doctrine depends in four
important ways upon the nature of the enactment, whether statutory
or regulatory, under attack for vagueness. First, “economic regulation
is subject to a less strict vagueness test” than noneconomic
27
regulation. Second, enactments with civil penalties are subject to a
less exacting test for precision than enactments carrying criminal
28
penalties. Third, a scienter requirement may “mitigate a law’s
vagueness” because such a requirement might provide some
assurance of “the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his
29
conduct is proscribed.” Finally, “perhaps the most important factor”
affecting the vagueness analysis is the question whether the law
“threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.
If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free speech or of
30
association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.”
Apart from vagueness doctrine, the due process entitlement to
“fair warning” and to an opportunity to comply with the law has other

25. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
26. Id. at 108–09. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974), elevated this concern to “perhaps
the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine,” more meaningful than the value of
notice, id. at 574; see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983) (“Although the
doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized
recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual notice, but the
other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a legislature establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement.’” (quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at 574)).
27. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982).
This is because the “subject matter” of economic regulation “is often more narrow,” because
“businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to
consult relevant legislation in advance of action,” and because “regulated enterprise may have
the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own inquiry, or by resort to an
administrative process.” Id. at 498; see also Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384
U.S. 35, 48–49 (1966) (explaining that the statute was not vague in part because “the appellants
will have access to the Authority for a ruling to clarify the issue”), abrogated on other grounds
by Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 343 (1989).
28. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498–99.
29. Id. at 499.
30. Id.

SOHONI IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

NOTICE AND THE NEW DEAL

2/25/2013 12:13 PM

1177

31

“manifestations” as well. Chief among them are the rule of lenity
and the rules pertaining to retroactivity in the law. In the criminal
context, the rule of lenity, which is “a sort of ‘junior version of the
vagueness doctrine,’” resolves ambiguity in a criminal statute so that
32
the statute will apply “only to conduct clearly covered.” The
conventional formulation of the rule of lenity is the maxim that
33
“penal statutes should be strictly construed against the government.”
By encouraging precision in the drafting of criminal statutes, this rule
protects the criminal defendant’s right to receive sufficient notice that
34
she might be breaking the law.
Limitations on the retroactive application of laws also protect the
values of notice and fair warning that underlie constitutional due
process notice. If a rule is applied retroactively, the targets of the rule
will be subjected to a legal regime that they could not have
anticipated. Retroactive application of a new rule thus has the
potential to cause unfair surprise, thereby threatening the value of
35
fairness that due process notice doctrine seeks to serve. Animosity
to retroactivity is “deeply rooted” in American law and “embodies a
legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic”: the notion that
“[e]lementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals
should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform
36
their conduct accordingly.”
The rules on retroactivity apply differently in the criminal and
the civil contexts. The constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws

31. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (identifying “three related
manifestations of the fair warning requirement”: vagueness doctrine, the rule of lenity, and the
prohibition against retroactive application of statutes, including the rule that prohibits “applying
a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior
judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope”).
32. Id. (quoting HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 95
(1968)).
33. 3 NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 59:3, at 125 (6th
ed. 2001).
34. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (Holmes, J.) (“[A] fair warning should
be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law
intends to do if a certain line is passed.”). The fit between the rule and the value of notice may
only be a partial one. Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2425 (2006)
(arguing that “fair notice is at most a partial justification for the rule of lenity”).
35. See Douglas W. Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the
Original Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 527–28 (1987) (“Prospectivity is an
essential requirement of the rule of law because only prospective laws allow citizens to plan
their conduct so as to conform to the law.”).
36. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994).
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bars legislatures from retroactively criminalizing conduct. As a
matter of due process, courts are likewise barred from applying “a
novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the
statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within
38
its scope.”
In the civil context, in contrast, no per se barrier exists to the
retroactive application of statutes as such; the mere fact of
39
retroactivity is not enough to require invalidation of a statute.
Courts do, however, interpret statutes in accordance with a
presumption against retroactivity, which is in effect a clear-statement
rule requiring Congress to state unambiguously when it wishes a
statute to “impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a
party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to
40
transactions already completed.” If the language meets this clearstatement test, the Court will then consider whether the legislation
has an impermissibly retroactive effect as a matter of substantive due
41
process. This inquiry can turn on a variety of factors, including
whether the law affects procedural or substantive rights, whether it
appears punitive, and whether it creates new liabilities where none

37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; see also United States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. 88, 95 (1871)
(“There can be no legal conviction, nor any valid judgment pronounced upon conviction, unless
the law creating the offence be at the time in existence.”).
38. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997); see also Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347, 353–54 (1964) (“If a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from
passing such a law, it must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process
Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction. The fundamental
principle that ‘the required criminal law must have existed when the conduct in issue occurred’
must apply to bar retroactive criminal prohibitions emanating from courts as well as from
legislatures.” (citations omitted) (quoting JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LAW 58–59 (2d ed. 1960))).
39. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267 (“[T]he potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation
is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope.”).
40. Id. at 280 (“When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court
must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would
impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or
impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate
retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear
congressional intent favoring such a result.”); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S.
211, 237 (1995) (“[T]he traditional rule, confirmed only last Term, [is] that statutes do not apply
retroactively unless Congress expressly states that they do.”).
41. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321 (2001) (noting that the judgment as to whether a
statute acts retroactively “should be informed and guided by familiar considerations of fair
notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations” (quoting Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343,
358 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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previously existed, but the overarching inquiry focuses on
“considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled
43
expectations.”
This (perhaps dry) mapping of the black-letter components of
modern due process notice doctrine should not obscure the
overarching and common significance of these rules. Supreme Court
precedent protects the values of notice and fair warning both through
substantive doctrines and through canons of construction and in both
the civil and criminal contexts. Although these doctrines are not
generally spoken of as a cluster, they are deeply interconnected. Part
of the project of this Article is to show the links between these
doctrines and how they move in concert. The next Part explains how
the Court reshaped the chief contours of these doctrines over the
span of the New Deal.
II. THE NEW DEAL REFORMULATION OF DUE PROCESS NOTICE
DOCTRINE
Concerns about due process notice would have loomed much
larger at the beginning of the New Deal than they do today. In the
early 1930s, the possibility of secret law was not merely hypothetical.
One of the capstone achievements of President Roosevelt’s first New
44
Deal, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) resulted in the
production of law at a rate that made it no mean feat merely to find
applicable positive law. Hundreds of codes prohibiting thousands of
practices were approved by the National Recovery Administration
45
(NRA), the agency responsible for implementing the NIRA. There

42. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 282–83.
43. Id. at 270.
44. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (terminated by Exec.
Order No. 7252 (Dec. 21, 1935), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2006)).
45. See GARY DEAN BEST, PRIDE, PREJUDICE, AND POLITICS: ROOSEVELT VERSUS
RECOVERY, 1933–1938, at 79 (1991) (noting that “between 4,000 and 5,000 business practices
were prohibited,” roughly 3,000 administrative orders spanning over 10,000 pages were
promulgated, and “innumerable opinions and directions from national, regional, and code
boards” interpreted and enforced the NIRA’s directives (quoting Raymond Clapper, Between
You and Me: Business Men To Protest NRA Arbitrary Legal System When Congress Meets,
WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1934, at 2) (internal quotation mark omitted)); Erwin N. Griswold,
Government in Ignorance of the Law—A Plea for Better Publication of Executive Legislation, 48
HARV. L. REV. 198, 199 (1934) (“In the first year of the National Recovery Administration,
2998 administrative orders were issued. In addition to these, the Recovery Administration has
adopted numerous regulations and sets of regulations which are to be found scattered among
5991 press releases during this period. It has been estimated that the total amount of ‘law’

SOHONI IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1180

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/25/2013 12:13 PM

[Vol. 62:1169

was not yet a Federal Register to collect and disseminate such
46
pronouncements. The NRA “boasted” that it “would not be bound
47
by ‘legalisms’” or “legalistic requirements” in its lawmaking. But the
practical effect of the NRA’s stance was that it “dispense[d] with one
of the most basic elements of a fair legal system: notice through
48
published laws.”
An explicit example of the New Deal Court’s concerns about
notice appears in a case that is famous for an entirely different
reason: because it is one of just two instances in which the Supreme
Court has struck down a statute as an unconstitutional delegation of
49
power to the executive branch. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan
addressed a section of the NIRA that prohibited transportation in
commerce of oil produced or withdrawn in excess of state laws or
50
regulations. The portion of the Petroleum Code limiting oil
51
production had been rescinded by executive order. But because of a
“failure to give appropriate public notice of the change in the
section,” this rescission was, for all intents and purposes, unknown
even to “the persons affected, the prosecuting authorities, and the
52
courts.” Lurking in the backdrop of the Court’s invalidation of the
challenged section of the NIRA as an unconstitutional delegation of
53
legislative power was the Court’s jarring recognition that the vast
executive power created by the NIRA could be wielded secretly—in a
manner unbeknownst to litigants as sophisticated as those practicing
before the nation’s highest court. Even Justice Cardozo, though he
would have upheld the NIRA’s delegation of authority, wrote that
evolved during the first year of the NRA’s activities exceeds 10,000 pages, probably a greater
volume than the total amount of statute law contained in the United States Code.”).
46. See Griswold, supra note 45, at 198–99, 203–05.
47. Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal Profession and the Development of Administrative Law,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1119, 1126–28 (1997).
48. Id. at 1127.
49. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
50. Id. at 405–06.
51. Id. at 412 (“The controversy with respect to the provision of § 4 of Article III of the
Petroleum Code was initiated and proceeded in the courts below upon a false assumption. That
assumption was that this section still contained the paragraph (eliminated by the Executive
Order [6199] of Sept. 13, 1933) by which production in excess of assigned quotas was made an
unfair practice and a violation of the Code.”). See also PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL
LAWYERS 70–71 (1982).
52. Panama Ref., 293 U.S. at 412.
53. See id. at 415 (“[Section 9(c)] gives to the President an unlimited authority to determine
the policy and to lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit. And
disobedience to his order is made a crime punishable by fine and imprisonment.”).
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“[o]ne must deplore the administrative methods that brought about
uncertainty for a time as to the terms of executive orders intended to
54
be law.”
Today, it is unthinkable that parties could litigate a case up to the
Supreme Court without knowing whether or not the provisions they
were arguing over still existed. But for the Court during the 1930s, the
absence of notice of the law was a tangible possibility, not merely
conjectural. Moreover, and this is perhaps the more important point,
the lapse in notice of the law came to the Court wrapped in a
challenge to the heart of the first New Deal agenda, with its
centralized planning, its industrial codes of law, and its innovative
administrative methods.
With this context in mind, the discussion below analyzes how the
Court’s stance on due process notice changed as the New Deal era
unfolded.
A. Vagueness
The years between 1914 and 1932 saw the birth of the void-forvagueness doctrine, which is to say, the transformation of vagueness
doctrine from a canon of statutory construction into a substantive
55
doctrine for invalidating statutes. By Connally v. General
56
Construction Co., in which it coined the still-current verbal
57
formulation of the doctrine, the Court had struck down criminal
58
statutes as vague on several occasions. By 1931, the requirement of
definiteness in statutory standards had “rapidly crystallized into an
59
imposing doctrine of constitutional law.” The Court during this
period held that statutory standards for “‘unreasonable prices,’

54. Id. at 434 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
55. See Lockwood, supra note 15, at 268 (“Although it is not easy to pinpoint the genesis of
the void for vagueness doctrine, at some point near the decision in Nash [v. United States, 229
U.S. 373 (1914)], a law’s vagueness was seen as violating the right of due process. This
determination allowed the United States Supreme Court to invalidate vague federal or state
enactments in a variety of disciplines as unconstitutional.” (footnote omitted)).
56. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
57. See id. at 391 (“[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.”).
58. Note, Indefinite Criteria of Definiteness in Statutes, 45 HARV. L. REV. 160, 160–61
(1931).
59. Id. at 160.
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‘reasonable profits,’ ‘real value’ and ‘current rate of wages’” were
60
unconstitutionally vague.
Considerations of vagueness formed a component or a backstop
to many of the pre-New Deal Court’s most notorious holdings. The
61
most obvious examples are the nondelegation cases. Both landmark
nondelegation decisions from this era—A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
62
Corp. v. United States and Panama Refining—faulted the vagueness
63
of the statutes under attack. But vagueness also played a part in
other important cases from this period with less evident connections
64
to legislative clarity. The famous Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, in
which the Court invalidated minimum-wage laws in Washington,
65
D.C., was not just a case about liberty of contract, but a case about
66
67
vagueness as well. Likewise, Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo,
60. Id. at 162–63 (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255
U.S. 81, 84 (1921); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927) passim; Int’l Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914) passim; and Connally, 269 U.S. 385 passim); see also, e.g.,
Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 286 U.S. 210, 243 (1932); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553,
567 (1931); Connally, 269 U.S. at 393–94; A.B. Small Co. v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233,
238–42 (1925).
61. Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 320 (2000) (noting that
the nondelegation doctrine is “closely connected to the void for vagueness doctrine, requiring
that certain laws be clear rather than open-ended”).
62. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
63. Id. at 530–31 (“As to the ‘codes of fair competition,’ . . . the question is more
fundamental. It is whether there is any adequate definition of the subject to which the codes are
to be addressed. What is meant by ‘fair competition’ as the term is used in the act? . . . [I]s it
used as a convenient designation for whatever set of laws the formulators of a code for a
particular trade or industry may propose and the President may approve (subject to certain
restrictions), or the President may himself prescribe, as being wise and beneficient
provisions . . . ?” (quoting National Industrial Recovery Act § 3, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 196
(1933))); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 418 (1935) (“[The law] speaks, parenthetically,
of a possible temporary restriction of production, but of what, or in what circumstances, it gives
no suggestion. The section also speaks in general terms of the conservation of natural resources,
but it prescribes no policy for the achievement of that end. It is manifest that this broad outline
is simply an introduction of the Act, leaving the legislative policy as to particular subjects to be
declared and defined, if at all, by the subsequent sections.”). The Court’s holdings in these cases,
by the way, were not inevitable. Some theories of improper delegation do not turn on the clarity
of the instructions given by Congress. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 420
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that where “a pure delegation of legislative power” exists, it
becomes “irrelevant whether the standards are adequate, because they are not standards related
to the exercise of executive or judicial powers” but instead “are, plainly and simply, standards
for further legislation”).
64. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled by W. Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
65. Id. at 561.
66. See id. at 555 (“The standard furnished by the statute for the guidance of the board is
so vague as to be impossible of practical application with any reasonable degree of accuracy.
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which is more generally thought of as a liberty-of-contract case, held
that the New York minimum-wage statute for women workers was
68
unconstitutionally vague.
After the New Deal, the Court showed much less concern with
vagueness. The Court rejected vagueness challenges to a variety of
69
statutes, both civil and criminal. These holdings were occasionally
joined with cases about federalism or liberty of contract. So, for
example, when the Court famously rejected federalism challenges to

What is sufficient to supply the necessary cost of living for a woman worker and maintain her in
good health and protect her morals is obviously not a precise or unvarying sum—not even
approximately so.”); see also Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 614 (1936)
(noting that “an additional ground of subordinate consequence” in Adkins was its “ruling that
defects in the prescribed standard stamped that Act as arbitrary and invalid”).
67. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
68. Id. at 608 (“The act of Congress had one standard, the living wage; this State act has
added another, reasonable value. The minimum wage must include both. What was vague
before has not been made any clearer.” (quoting People ex rel. Tipaldo v. Morehead, 200 N.E.
799, 801 (N.Y. 1936)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
69. See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 579–80
(1973) (rejecting a vagueness challenge to the Hatch Act, ch. 410, 53. Stat. 1147 (1939)
(amended), which prohibited federal employees from taking an active part in political
management or in political campaigns); Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 119 (1967) (rejecting a
vagueness attack to a statute making an alien who was homosexual subject to deportation for
“sexual affliction”); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 48–49 (1966)
(rejecting a vagueness attack to a state alcohol-control statute), abrogated on other grounds by
Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 343 (1989); United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372
U.S. 29, 33 (1963) (holding that the Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, 52 Stat. 1526 (1936), gave
sufficient warning that selling below cost for the purpose of destroying competition is unlawful);
Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 443, 448 (1954) (holding that a New York statute
authorizing disciplinary action against physicians was not unconstitutionally vague); Boyce
Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952) (noting that the scienter
requirement of knowledge or willful neglect in a federal regulation did “much to destroy any
force in the argument that application of the Regulation would be so unfair that it must be held
invalid”); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (holding that the phrase “crime
involving moral turpitude” does not render a deportation statute unconstitutional for vagueness
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 385–86, 412–
13 (1950) (rejecting a vagueness attack on a federal statute that conditioned recognition of a
labor organization on affidavits by its officers that they do not belong to the Communist Party);
United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 5–8 (1947) (rejecting a vagueness attack on a federal statute
that criminalized featherbedding); United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 523–24 (1942)
(rejecting a vagueness attack on a provision of federal income tax law); Neblett v. Carpenter,
305 U.S. 297, 303 (1938) (holding that certain provisions of the California Insurance Code, ch.
145, 1935 Cal. Stat. 496, are not so vague that “no one can determine what powers are intended
to be conferred upon the Commissioner”); see also Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 74 n.38
(“Since the advent of the New Deal Court, . . . there has been one economic vagueness
case . . . .”).
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the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) in United States v.
71
Darby, it also rejected the defendant’s vagueness challenge to the
provision of the act that criminalized the transportation in commerce
72
of goods that had been produced in violation of the act. And the
newly loosened standards for clarity had important effects on cases
addressing legislative delegations of authority to executive agencies
because the Court was no longer inclined to void such delegations for
73
impermissible vagueness.
The Court’s treatment of First Amendment vagueness attacks
evolved in the opposite fashion. In the pre-New Deal period, the
Court did not favorably regard vagueness challenges on First
Amendment grounds; vagueness challenges “received short shrift” in
74
free speech cases. In contrast, First Amendment vagueness
challenges began to gain traction by the late 1930s, and thereafter
75
developed into a formidable edifice of law.
Several distinct doctrinal shifts account for these tectonic
changes in vagueness cases. First, the Court tightened its standards
for sustaining facial attacks to the vagueness of laws. Second, the
Court altered its pre-New Deal methods for determining the
substantive vagueness of civil economic statutes. Third, the Court
insulated criminal laws from vagueness attacks by starting to treat
mens rea requirements as a substitute for legislative clarity.

70. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
71. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
72. Id. at 125–26 (“One who employs persons, without conforming to the prescribed wage
and hour conditions, to work on goods which he ships or expects to ship across state lines, is
warned that he may be subject to the criminal penalties of the Act. No more is required.”).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 574 (1939) (“In dealing with
legislation involving questions of economic adjustment, each enactment must be considered to
determine whether it states the purpose which the Congress seeks to accomplish and the
standards by which that purpose is to be worked out with sufficient exactness to enable those
affected to understand these limits. Within these tests the Congress needs specify only so far as
is reasonably practicable.”).
74. Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 74 n.38; see also, e.g., Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273,
277 (1915) (upholding the constitutionality of a law criminalizing the editing of printed matter
advocating disrespect for the law); Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 230, 247 (1915)
(upholding the constitutionality of a law creating a board of censors for motion pictures).
75. See generally Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507 (1948); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); see also Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 74
n.38 (noting the proliferation of First Amendment vagueness cases in the post-New Deal era).
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1. Facial Challenges. Before the New Deal and into the early
New Deal period, the Court entertained and sustained numerous
facial attacks to the vagueness of statutes, both civil and criminal,
without establishing first whether the statute gave fair warning to the
76
particular complainant before the Court. As late as 1939, the Court
77
in Lanzetta v. New Jersey insisted that it was proper to rule on a
facial attack to a New Jersey criminal statute that made it illegal for
persons with a record of prior convictions and without a lawful
78
occupation to consort in a “gang.” The Court’s opinion made no
reference to whether the challengers themselves had adequate notice
79
that their conduct was prohibited. The Court in this period took it
“for granted that [facial] invalidation of a statute for vagueness was
not precluded by a showing that the claimant or others had been
80
fairly warned.” This was for a simple reason: “The certainty required
by the Due Process Clause is not tested from the would-be violator’s
standpoint; the test is rather whether adequate guidance is given to
81
those who would be law-abiding.”
76. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 286 U.S. 210, 242–43 (1932) (holding facially
invalid a provision for the receivership of oil property in the case of an oil operator’s violation
of an act prohibiting waste on the ground that “it appears upon a mere inspection that these
general words and phrases are so vague and indefinite that any penalty prescribed for their
violation constitutes a denial of due process of law”); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 565 (1931)
(“[A]ppellant has been held liable to the penalties of the Act for his disobedience to it as it
stood when it was enacted. He was entitled at that time to assert his constitutional right by
virtue of the invalidity of the statute upon its face.”); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465
(1927) (holding facially invalid a Colorado antitrust law because of its vagueness); Connally v.
Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 395 (1926) (holding facially invalid an Oklahoma statute
regulating wages and hours because of its vagueness); A.B. Small Co. v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co.,
267 U.S. 233, 238–42 (1925) (holding facially invalid a statute prohibiting the exaction of
unreasonable prices for necessaries because of its vagueness); United States v. L. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) (holding facially invalid section 4 of the Lever Act, ch. 53,
40 Stat. 276 (1917) (amended), because of its vagueness); see also Int’l Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 223–24 (1914) (reversing convictions under vague Kentucky antitrust
legislation using a rationale amounting to facial invalidation).
77. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
78. Id. at 452–53; see also id. at 453 (“If on its face the challenged provision is repugnant to
the due process clause, specification of details of the offense intended to be charged would not
serve to validate it. It is the statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the rule to
govern conduct and warns against transgression.” (citations omitted)).
79. See id.
80. Alfred Hill, Vagueness and Police Discretion: The Supreme Court in a Bog, 51
RUTGERS L. REV. 1289, 1295 (1999). Although odd exceptions to this practice existed, “the
opinions in these cases show no awareness of departure from the general practice.” Id. at 1295–
96.
81. United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 458 (1953) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
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In 1940, the Court created First Amendment overbreadth
82
doctrine in Thornhill v. Alabama, which expressly singled out First
Amendment cases as being a special context in which facial attacks
83
were endorsed. Perhaps not coincidentally, the Court thereafter
began to inquire into whether a statute was vague as applied to the
challenger as a prerequisite to addressing a facial vagueness attack on
a statute that did not implicate the First Amendment.
This shift was gradual, not absolute. In Robinson v. United
84
States, for example, the Court rejected a facial attack on a federal
criminal kidnapping statute by citing the fact that the particular
conduct charged against the defendant unquestionably came within
85
the statutory proscription. Two years later, however, in United States
86
v. Petrillo, the Court considered and rejected a facial attack on an
economic criminal statute without considering whether the particular
defendant charged had received adequate notice that his conduct was
87
88
criminal. In Williams v. United States, the Court reverted to the
Robinson approach and rejected a facial attack on a federal statute
that prohibited extracting confessions by force because it was “plain
as a pikestaff” that the confessions at issue were inadmissible
89
90
evidence. In United States v. Harriss, which concerned the Federal
91
Regulation of Lobbying Act, the Court rejected a facial vagueness
attack on the statute without first determining whether the
92
defendants’ conduct was unambiguously prohibited by it.

82. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
83. Id. at 98.
84. Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282 (1945).
85. See id. at 286 (“[W]e cannot doubt that a kidnapper who violently struck the head of his
victim with an iron bar, as evidence showed that this petitioner did, comes within the group
Congress had in mind. This purpose to authorize a death penalty is clear even though Congress
did not unmistakably mark some boundary between a pin prick and a permanently mutilated
body. It is for Congress and not for us to decide whether it is wise public policy to inflict the
death penalty at all.”).
86. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947).
87. See id. at 5–6, 12 (“[T]he motion to dismiss on the ground of vagueness and
indefiniteness squarely raises the question of whether the section invoked in the indictment is
void in toto, barring all further actions under it, in this, and every other case.”).
88. Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
89. Id. at 101.
90. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
91. Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, ch. 753, tit. III, 60 Stat. 839 (1946) (repealed
1995).
92. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 627.
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And so it went. The Court’s vacillating approach, however, hides
an underlying consistency. In the above cases, the Court entertained
facial attacks to the vagueness of nonspeech statutes. But Lanzetta
appears to be the last case to expressly endorse and actually sustain a
facial vagueness attack outside the First Amendment context without
any inquiry into whether the law was vague as applied to the
93
challenger.
In 1963, the Court in United States v. National Dairy Products
94
Corp. made it explicit: in nonspeech cases, the challenger had to
show that the law was vague as applied to her before she could
95
prevail on a facial challenge. Put another way, the Court’s treatment
of facial challenges to the vagueness of nonspeech statutes would
thereafter merge with its treatment of any facial challenge to a
96
nonspeech statute. At this point, “non-speech overbreadth” for
vagueness cases was formally interred, even though it had been

93. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). For a discussion of the Court’s
rare and silent departures from this rule for statutes implicating other preferred constitutional
rights, see infra notes 100–101 and accompanying text. United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483
(1948), is not to the contrary. Evans sustained a facial attack on a statute that prohibited
concealing and harboring aliens because of a legislative drafting error that made the penalty
provisions of the statute incomprehensible. Id. at 495. As Professor Amsterdam notes, this was a
case “involving a statute found so unclear as to be unenforceable, despite no want of adequate
warning.” Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 86 n.92.
94. United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963).
95. See id. at 33 (“In determining the sufficiency of the notice a statute must of necessity be
examined in the light of the conduct with which a defendant is charged.” (citing Robinson v.
United States, 324 U.S. 282 (1945))); id. at 36 (“[T]he approach to ‘vagueness’ governing a case
like this is different from that followed in cases arising under the First Amendment. There we
are concerned with the vagueness of the statute ‘on its face’ because such vagueness may in
itself deter constitutionally protected and socially desirable conduct.”); id. (“We are thus
permitted to consider the warning provided by [the statute] not only in terms of the statute ‘on
its face’ but also in the light of the conduct to which it is applied.”); id. at 37 (“National Dairy
and Wise were adequately forewarned of the illegal conduct charged against them . . . .”); see
also Hill, supra note 80, at 1295–96 (“[P]rior to 1963 it was taken for granted that invalidation of
a statute for vagueness was not precluded by a showing that the claimant or others had been
fairly warned. . . . United States v. National Dairy Products Corp. was the first instance of a
considered refusal to decide the vagueness issue by facial analysis.” (footnotes omitted)).
96. Professor Richard Fallon has shown that the Court does not obey consistently its
professed rule that as-applied challenges have priority over facial challenges. See Richard H.
Fallon, Fact and Fiction About As-Applied and Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 946
(2011) (“Although the Supreme Court sometimes says the contrary, it by no means always, or
even typically, prefers as-applied to facial challenges . . . . To the contrary, the Court frequently
eschews opportunities to decide cases on narrow, as-applied bases even when such bases are
available.”). In the subcategory of cases addressing facial vagueness challenges, however, the
Court has hewed to its announced approach except in rare circumstances involving certain
preferred constitutional rights. See infra notes 100–101 and accompanying text.
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effectively defunct since Lanzetta. Subsequent holdings, such as those
97
98
in Parker v. Levy and United States v. Mazurie, entrenched this
99
approach, which continues to be applied in modern cases. In recent
decades, the Court has sporadically departed from this practice by
facially invalidating statutes as vague when constitutional values were
100
potentially at issue, but these cases are hardly ringing endorsements
101
of the general propriety of facial vagueness attacks. By thus curbing
the availability of facial vagueness attacks outside the First
Amendment context, the Court sharply raised the bar for bringing a
successful vagueness challenge.
2. Civil Economic Legislation.
Vagueness doctrine had
traditionally treated a term’s common-law meaning or the
conventions of its usage in a trade as sources of semantic content that
102
could clarify otherwise ambiguous statutory terminology. Thus,
97. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
98. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
99. See id. at 550 (“It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not
involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at
hand.” (citing Nat’l Dairy, 372 U.S. 29)); Parker, 417 U.S. at 756 (“One to whose conduct a
statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.”); see also Chapman v.
United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991) (“First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the
statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this
case.” (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 (1975))); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495–500 (1982) (“A plaintiff who engages in some
conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the
conduct of others. A court should therefore examine the complainant’s conduct before
analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law. . . . Flipside’s facial challenge fails because,
under the test appropriate to either a quasi-criminal or a criminal law, the ordinance is
sufficiently clear as applied to Flipside.” (footnote omitted)); Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges
to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 304 (1994) (“The substantive law of
vagueness does not require an exception to the Salerno presumption; indeed, it contains its own
version. It is well established that a litigant whose conduct is clearly proscribed by a statute
cannot complain that the statute would be ambiguous as applied to a third party.”).
100. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (involving a facial attack on a
city ordinance criminalizing loitering); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (involving a
facial attack on a criminal loitering statute); see also Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 310 & nn. 298–
302 (noting decisions involving vagrancy, loitering, price fixing, and abortion).
101. See Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 310 (noting that when the Court has sustained facial
attacks to vagrancy and abortion laws, it has done so “without acknowledging it was doing so or
discussing the propriety of such action”).
102. See Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 286 U.S. 210, 242–43 (1932) (“The general
expressions employed here are not known to the common law or shown to have any meaning in
the oil industry sufficiently definite to enable those familiar with the operation of oil wells to
apply them with any reasonable degree of certainty.”); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391 (1926) (“[I]t will be enough for present purposes to say generally that the decisions of
the court, upholding statutes as sufficiently certain, rested upon the conclusion that they
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whereas the intelligibility of a generally applicable statute would be
103
tested by reference to a person of “ordinary intelligence” or by
104
reference to “well-settled” meaning, a statute regulating businesses
would be assessed by reference to whether it was comprehensible to
105
those engaged in the regulated trade. Economic laws, then, were not
subjected to a qualitatively lesser test for vagueness; rather, they were
subject to the generally applicable rule that a law provided adequate
notice when it was comprehensible to those whom it regulated.
This methodology largely disappeared after the New Deal. The
precise moment is difficult to pinpoint. The turning point may simply
have been the “switch in time” cases authorizing rational economic
106
legislation. Or it may have been a byproduct or offshoot of the new
line of First Amendment cases that emphasized with fresh vigor how
107
important it was to protect speech from vague laws. The method
that took its place was the rule that economic laws are subject to
relaxed vagueness review simply because they are economic laws, just
as they are subject to minimal review for policy purposes. In the
decades following the New Deal, it became uncontroversial to
announce that “purely economic regulation” was subject to a less
108
stringent vagueness standard.
employed words or phrases having a technical or other special meaning, well enough known to
enable those within their reach to correctly apply them, or a well-settled common-law
meaning . . . .” (citations omitted)); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502 (1925)
(“Furthermore, the evidence, while conflicting, warrants the conclusion that the term ‘kosher’
has a meaning well enough defined to enable one engaged in the trade to correctly apply it, at
least as a general thing.”).
103. Cf. Connally, 269 U.S. at 391 (noting that vagueness cases often turn on judicial
determinations of what “men of common intelligence” would comprehend).
104. Id. (noting the role of “a well-settled common-law meaning” in saving statutes from
vagueness challenges).
105. See, e.g., supra note 102.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); cf. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938)
(contrasting the level of scrutiny that is applicable in categories of cases involving preferred
liberties with the level of scrutiny that is appropriate to “regulatory legislation affecting
ordinary commercial transactions”).
107. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103–04 (1940) (acknowledging that “the
rights of employers and employees to conduct their economic affairs and to compete with others
for a share in the products of industry are subject to modification or qualification in the interests
of the society in which they exist,” but further noting that the state may not curtail “the effective
exercise of the right to discuss freely industrial relations which are matters of public concern”).
108. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 n.10 (1974) (“Compare the less stringent
requirements of the modern vagueness cases dealing with purely economic regulation.”);
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162–63 (1972) (“In the field of regulatory
statutes governing business activities, where the acts limited are in a narrow category, greater
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Separately, the New Deal Court altered its treatment of civil laws
vis-à-vis criminal laws. Prior to the New Deal, the Supreme Court had
held that civil statutes and criminal statutes were equally subject to
void-for-vagueness analysis. The case that presented this question,
109
A.B. Small v. American Sugar Refining Co., involved a breach-of110
contract action over two sugar contracts. The petitioner contended
that the contracts were unenforceable because they violated the
111
provision of the Lever Act that forbade “unreasonable” profits on
112
such sales. In response, the seller argued that an earlier criminal
113
case, United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., required the Court to
reject the petitioner’s defense because that case had held that the
standard of “unreasonable” profits was an unconstitutionally vague
114
standard for criminal liability. The Small Court agreed that the
reasoning of Cohen governed in the civil context:
The defendant attempts to distinguish [Cohen and its progeny]
because they were criminal prosecutions. But that is not an adequate
distinction. The ground or principle of the decisions was not such as
to be applicable only to criminal prosecutions. It was not the
criminal penalty that was held invalid, but the exaction of obedience
to a rule or standard which was so vague and indefinite as really to
115
be no rule or standard at all.

The Court went on to state that legislation “declaring the
transaction unlawful or stripping a participant of his rights under it”
would equally fall within the rule of Cohen, and it approved the
reasoning of several lower courts that had similarly held that civil

leeway is allowed. . . . The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder are not in
business and not alerted to the regulatory schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume they would
have no understanding of their meaning and impact if they read them.” (citations omitted));
United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963) (“[In cases arising under the
First Amendment] we are concerned with the vagueness of the statute ‘on its face’ because such
vagueness may in itself deter constitutionally protected and socially desirable conduct. No such
factor is present . . . where the statute is directed only at conduct designed to destroy
competition . . . .” (citations omitted)).
109. A.B. Small v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925).
110. Id. at 239.
111. Lever Act, ch. 53, 40 Stat. 276 (1917) (repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1921, ch. 136, 41 Stat.
1359).
112. Small, 267 U.S. at 238.
113. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
114. Small, 267 U.S. at 238.
115. Id. at 239.

SOHONI IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/25/2013 12:13 PM

NOTICE AND THE NEW DEAL

1191

116

statutes could be void for vagueness. Two years later, the Court
reiterated that the principle of due process forbidding vague
117
legislation “has application as well in civil as in criminal legislation.”
After the New Deal, the Court’s stance on this issue shifted in a
subtle way that would ultimately prove important. The Court started
to emphasize that criminal statutes were subject to more rigorous
review for vagueness than civil statutes. The Court stated that “[t]he
standards of certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is higher than
118
in those depending primarily upon civil sanction for enforcement.”
By 1951, the differential treatment was entrenched still more deeply.
119
In Jordan v. De George, the Court strongly implied that noncriminal
statutes were presumptively exempt from vagueness attack when it
stated that it was only entertaining a vagueness challenge to the civil
120
immigration statute because of the “grave nature” of deportation.
Indeed, the Court in Jordan went on to state that the “essential
purpose of the ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine is to warn individuals of
121
the criminal consequences of their conduct.” The distinction for the
purposes of vagueness analysis between civil and criminal laws was
122
subsequently reiterated on several occasions, and the modern rule
123
continues to reflect this analytical divide.
116. Id.
117. Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 463 (1927). Other vagueness challenges to civil
statutes during the same era were not successful, but the Court never rested its rejection of
these challenges upon the civil nature of the legislation under attack. See, e.g., Old Dearborn
Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 196 (1936) (“[T]he phrases complained of
are sufficiently definite, considering the whole statute . . . .”); Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Groeger,
266 U.S. 521, 523–24 (1925) (“[The language in question] is as definite and certain as is the
common law rule; and to hold that the duty imposed cannot be ascertained would be as
unreasonable as it would be to declare that the common law rule . . . is too indefinite to be
enforced or complied with.”); Miller v. Strahl, 239 U.S. 426, 434 (1915) (“Rules of conduct must
necessarily be expressed in general terms and depend for their application upon the
circumstances, and circumstances vary.”).
118. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948).
119. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
120. Id. at 230–31 (“It should be emphasized that this statute does not declare certain
conduct to be criminal. Its function is to apprise aliens of the consequences which follow after
conviction and sentence of the requisite two crimes. Despite the fact that this is not a criminal
statute, we shall nevertheless examine the application of the vagueness doctrine to this case. We
do this in view of the grave nature of deportation.”).
121. Id. at 230 (emphasis added) (citing Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951)).
122. See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967) (“It is true that this Court has held the
‘void for vagueness’ doctrine applicable to civil as well as criminal actions. However, this is
where ‘the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard . . . was so vague and indefinite as really
to be no rule or standard at all . . . .’” (last alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
A.B. Small Co. v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925))); Barenblatt v. United States,

SOHONI IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1192

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/25/2013 12:13 PM

[Vol. 62:1169

This shift in the verbal articulation of the formula may seem a
slight one—a mere change in emphasis, or perhaps a statement of an
unobjectionable or obvious fact in a system of laws that frequently,
and without much ado, treats civil and criminal laws quite differently.
But insofar as vagueness doctrine was concerned, the Court’s
emphasis on the civil-criminal divide appears to have had more than
slight consequences. Since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has not
struck down a federal civil statute regulating economic behavior as
124
void for vagueness. On more than one occasion, it has reversed
decisions by lower federal courts that have struck federal civil statutes
125
as vague. State or local civil statutes that have been held void for
126
vagueness have implicated First Amendment values. Conversely,
vagueness challenges have retained some potency when levied against
127
128
criminal statutes, usually state or local, but occasionally federal.
360 U.S. 109, 137 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (“It goes without saying that a law to be valid
must be clear enough to make its commands understandable. For obvious reasons, the standard
of certainty required in criminal statutes is more exacting than in noncriminal statutes.”).
123. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99
(1982) (“The Court has also expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than
criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.”).
124. See Jeffrey I. Tilden, Note, Big Mama Rag: An Inquiry into Vagueness, 67 VA. L. REV.
1543, 1543 (1981) (“[Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980),] marks
the first time since 1925 [Small] that a federal court has declared [a federal civil statute] to be
void for vagueness.”). In Big Mama Rag, the D.C. Circuit held a Treasury regulation’s definition
of the term “educational” to be unconstitutionally vague in violation of the First Amendment.
Id. at 1032. When, on rare occasions, lower courts have held that federal statutes are vague, the
Supreme Court has rebuffed them. See infra note 125.
125. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 159 (1974) (“[T]he standard of ‘cause’ set
forth in the Lloyd-La Follette Act[, 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970),] as a limitation on the Government’s
authority to discharge federal employees is constitutionally sufficient against the charges both of
overbreadth and of vagueness.”); U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 568 (1973) (sustaining over vagueness and overbreadth challenges the Hatch Act’s
prohibition against federal employees taking an active part in political management or in
political campaigns).
126. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 611, 622–23 (1976) (invalidating a local
ordinance “regulat[ing] most forms of door-to-door canvassing and solicitation”); Keyishian v.
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 593–94, 604 (1967) (invalidating New York statutory provisions
that made treasonable or seditious words or acts a ground for removal from the public school
system or state employment); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 361, 379–80 (1964) (invalidating
Washington statutes requiring loyalty oaths as a condition of employment for teachers and state
employees); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 425–26, 428–29 (1963) (invalidating a Virginia
statutory provision that restricted the practice of advising prospective litigants to seek particular
attorneys); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 497, 504–06 (1952) (invalidating a New
York statutory provision concerning licensing of motion pictures).
127. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 568 (1974) (invalidating a state statute
prohibiting “flag-misuse”); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972)
(invalidating a city vagrancy ordinance); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615–16
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Although the Court continued to describe its stance as one of
“greater tolerance” to vagueness in civil economic statutes than in
129
criminal statutes, this understates the case. The doctrine of due
process notice fell into such desuetude in the civil economic context
that, in 1983, Justice Brennan noted with evident surprise that the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit “apparently believed that, in
cases not involving criminal sanctions, formal administrative
rulemakings, or activities protected by the First Amendment, the Due
130
Process Clause imposes virtually no requirement of fair warning.”
In short, judicial enforcement of minimal standards for linguistic
clarity for civil economic legislation evaporated after the New Deal.
3. Criminal Legislation. Although criminal legislation remained
subject to scrutiny for vagueness, the vulnerability of criminal
legislation to vagueness attack diminished during the New Deal. The
reason for this was that the Court settled upon a novel doctrinal tool
for deflecting vagueness challenges to criminal statutes: the principle
that a mens rea element in a criminal statute could mitigate a lack of
clarity in its language.
Before the New Deal, the Court had used statutory mens rea
elements in a different fashion—as a means to protect the interests of
accused defendants in having notice of complex laws. In 1933, in
131
United States v. Murdock, the Court held that in the criminal tax
132
context, the term “willfully” meant an “evil motive”; only the errors
of the “purposeful tax violator” would meet the standard of
(1971) (invalidating a city loitering ordinance); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1966)
(invalidating a statute that allowed a jury to “impose costs upon a defendant who has been
found by the jury to be not guilty of a crime charged against him”); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U.S. 451, 458 (1939) (invalidating a state antigang statute).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952). For one explanation why
the Court might adopt a different approach to federal and state statutes, see Amsterdam, supra
note 15, at 83 n.80, 86–87 & nn.92–97.
129. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982).
130. Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 969 (1983) (Brennan, J.) (dissenting from denial
of certiorari). Justice Brennan went on to state that the Court had “frequently entertained claims
that regulations of economic and professional activity are unconstitutionally vague, even when
the law at issue depends on civil enforcement and has no apparent effect on First Amendment
rights.” Id. at 970 (emphasis added). This characterization is somewhat loose; the post-New
Deal cases he cites may have “entertained” such challenges, but none actually sustained them.
131. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
132. Id. at 396 (“Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide
misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a return, or as to the
adequacy of the records he maintained, should become a criminal by his mere failure to
measure up to the prescribed standard of conduct.”).

SOHONI IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1194

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/25/2013 12:13 PM

[Vol. 62:1169

133

willfulness. The special Murdock construction of willfulness in the
tax context is an “exception to the traditional rule” that ignorance of
the law is no excuse, and it applies “largely due to the complexity of
134
the tax laws.” In other words, within the isolated context of federal
criminal tax laws, the Court treated a statutory willfulness term as
tightening the standard for criminal culpability by reading such a term
as requiring the government to prove a knowing violation of the tax
135
law by the accused.
After the New Deal, however, the jurisprudence of mens rea
took an interesting tack in the context of vagueness challenges. The
Court began to rely on mens rea terms—initially willfulness terms,
but eventually other intent terms too—as a reason to rebut or deflect
vagueness attacks on criminal statutes.
This was a curious turn. Logically speaking, mens rea and clarity
are apples and oranges, or nonfungible goods. The presence of a
mens rea requirement in a criminal statute cannot make otherwise
unclear statutory language clear as to what it prohibits. But after
rebuffing—or, more accurately, ignoring—the possibility of equating
136
mens rea with clarity in several cases, the Court eventually seized
upon this method for quelling vagueness attacks.
On three occasions between 1936 and 1942, the Court cited a
statute’s scienter requirement as its basis for rejecting a vagueness

133. Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable
Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341, 366 (1998) (quoting United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 361
(1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991); Davies, supra note 133, at 363, 366
(“In a long line of cases beginning in 1933 with United States v. Murdock, the Supreme Court
repeatedly rejected arguments by the government that the maxim should preclude violators of
the federal tax code from claiming that their ignorance or misunderstanding of the tax
provisions excused their violations. . . . Throughout the tax decisions that followed Murdock, the
Court repeatedly stressed the complexity of the tax code as the basis for its construction of the
willfulness term.” (footnotes omitted)).
135. The Murdock line survived the New Deal intact and continues to be applied in modern
cases. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191–92 (1998); Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200. This rule
has also been applied to antistructuring. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 136–37
(1994).
136. See, e.g., United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) (striking down a
Lever Act provision as vague without discussing the willfulness term). Mens rea was also noted,
though in dicta, in Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502–03 (1925), and
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 348 (1918). In both of these cases, the Court found the
challenged laws specific enough to be comprehensible to the individuals regulated even apart
from the fact that only knowing violations were punished. Hygrade Provision Co., 266 U.S. at
502; Omaechevarria, 246 U.S. at 348.
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attack. But the battle over this question was really only decisively
138
joined in Screws v. United States. As part of a New Deal initiative,
President Roosevelt sought to invoke the criminal provisions of
federal civil rights statutes to provide a federal response to the
139
lynching of African Americans by white supremacists. The statutes
criminalized the deprivation of constitutional rights by officials acting
140
under color of legal authority. In one of the four separate opinions
that would ultimately dispose of the case, the plurality recounted the
“shocking and revolting” circumstances whereby an African
American, Robert Hall, was brutally murdered by a Georgia sheriff
141
who had a vendetta against him. The sheriff, Screws, was alleged to
have been acting under color of Georgia law to willfully deprive Hall
of his rights to life, liberty, and due process of law and for conspiring
142
to do the same.
Upon conviction, the defendant appealed on vagueness grounds.
He contended that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because
the standard of due process incorporated by the statute created “no
143
ascertainable standard of guilt.” As the plurality put it, the
challenged act “would incorporate by reference a large body of
changing and uncertain law. That law is not always reducible to
specific rules, is expressible only in general terms, and turns many
144
times on the facts of a particular case.” The defendant argued that
“such a body of legal principles lacks the basic specificity necessary
145
for criminal statutes under our system of government.”
While acknowledging the gravity of the vagueness attack, the
plurality rejected this argument by citing the element of willfulness in
137. See United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942) (rejecting a vagueness challenge to
a tax evasion statute in part because of a willfulness provision and stating that “[a] mind intent
upon willful evasion is inconsistent with surprised innocence”); Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S.
19, 27–28 (1941) (rejecting a vagueness challenge in part because of the statute’s scienter
element, which required “intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained is to be
used to the injury of the United States”); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 247
(1936) (rejecting a vagueness challenge to a Federal Communications Commission order
because the act only punished knowing and willful padding of charges).
138. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101–02 (1945) (plurality opinion).
139. See John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REV. 447, 473–74
(2001).
140. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241–242 (2006).
141. Screws, 325 U.S. at 92 (plurality opinion).
142. Id. at 92–93.
143. Id. at 95.
144. Id. at 96.
145. Id.
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the statute. The plurality reasoned that “willfully” as used in the
challenged act “connot[ed] a purpose to deprive a person of a specific
146
On that reading, “[a]n evil motive to
constitutional right.”
accomplish that which the statute condemns becomes a constituent
element of the crime,” an element that had to be submitted to a
147
jury. And because the willful intent described by the law meant only
the intent to deprive a person of “a right which has been made
specific either by the express terms of the Constitution or laws of the
United States or by decisions interpreting them,” the law was not
148
indefinite.
The dissent thought this reasoning was ludicrous, and said so:
It is as novel as it is an inadmissible principle that a criminal
statute of indefinite scope can be rendered definite by requiring that
a person “willfully” commit what Congress has not defined but
which, if Congress had defined, could constitutionally be
outlawed. . . . It has not been explained how all the considerations of
unconstitutional vagueness which are laid bare in the early part of
the Court’s opinion evaporate by suggesting that what is otherwise
149
too vaguely defined must be “willfully” committed.

The dissenting Justices remarked that the plurality’s reasoning
“amount[ed] to saying that the black heart of the defendant” could
enable him to know what deprivations of constitutional rights were
forbidden, “although we as judges are not able to define their classes
150
or their limits.”
Notwithstanding the odd combination of opinions that produced
151
the outcome in Screws, the rule was thereafter settled. In American
152
Communications Ass’n v. Douds, the Court addressed the provision

146. Id. at 101.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 104–05 (“Of course, willful conduct cannot make definite that which is undefined.
But willful violators of constitutional requirements, which have been defined, certainly are in no
position to say that they had no adequate advance notice that they would be visited with
punishment. When they act willfully in the sense in which we use the word, they act in open
defiance or in reckless disregard of a constitutional requirement which has been made specific
and definite.”).
149. Id. at 153 (Roberts, Frankfurter & Jackson, JJ., dissenting).
150. Id. at 151.
151. See Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 87 n.98 (noting that “‘scienter’ has become a
recognized element of the lore of vagueness”).
152. Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 that, as a condition
of recognition of a labor union, required officers of the union to file
affidavits stating that they did not belong to the Communist Party and
154
did not believe in the overthrow of the government by force. The
Court held that because criminal punishment under this provision
155
would require proof of willfulness, the statute was not vague,
despite the “breadth of such [statutory] terms as ‘affiliated,’ ‘supports’
156
and ‘illegal or unconstitutional methods.’”
The Court would
thereafter frequently cite a statute’s mens rea requirement as a factor
157
in its decision to reject a vagueness challenge to it.
Interestingly, the evolution of the Court’s treatment of the mens
rea requirement echoes the evolution of its stance toward as-applied

153. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2006)).
154. Douds, 339 U.S. at 385–86.
155. Id. at 413 (“[S]ince the constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice
to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair
warning, the fact that punishment is restricted to acts done with knowledge that they contravene
the statute makes this objection [of vagueness] untenable.”).
156. Id. at 412. The statute at issue, section 9(h) of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, provided as follows:
No investigation shall be made by the [National Labor Relations] Board of any
question affecting commerce concerning the representation of employees, raised by a
labor organization . . . unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit . . . by each
officer of such labor organization and the officers of any national or international
labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a
member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not
believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization that believes in or
teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or
unconstitutional methods.
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 9(h), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (Supp. III 1950) (repealed
1959).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 35 (1963) (observing
that the Robinson-Patman Act prohibited making sales “at unreasonably low prices for the
purpose of destroying competition” and stating that this “additional element of predatory intent
alleged in the indictment and required by the Act provides further definition of the prohibited
conduct” (emphasis added)); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952)
(“The statute punishes only those who knowingly violate the Regulation. This requirement of
the presence of culpable intent as a necessary element of the offense does much to destroy any
force in the argument that application of the Regulation would be so unfair that it must be held
invalid.”); United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947) (“It would strain the requirement for
certainty in criminal law standards too near the breaking point to say that it was impossible
judicially to determine whether a person knew when he was willfully attempting to compel
another to hire unneeded employees.”); cf. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979)
(invalidating a state abortion-control statute as vague in part because of “the absence of a
scienter requirement in the provision directing the physician to determine whether the fetus is
or may be viable”).
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and facial vagueness challenges described above. The Court’s
ultimate position is that a requirement that the defendant willfully,
knowingly, or purposefully contravene the statute—a mens rea
requirement—can save the whole statute from vagueness. This
means, in essence, that a facial attack upon the vagueness of a
criminal statute cannot succeed if a conviction under the statute
requires some proof of culpable intent by the defendant. This
approach resonates with the Court’s post-New Deal adoption of the
rule that as-applied vagueness must be shown before a facial attack
159
on vagueness can prevail.
By thus relying upon scienter
requirements as a substitute for statutory clarity, the Supreme Court
lowered the constitutional threshold of clarity for the mine run of
160
criminal laws.
B. Retroactivity
Derived from the English common law and ultimately from
161
Roman law,
the antiretroactivity principle was adopted into
162
American law in the young days of the republic. In the early
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court expanded the rule by
applying it to law whose prospective operation had the effect of
divesting rights that were “vested” prior to the date of the law’s
163
enactment.
Thus expanded and entrenched, the concept of
retroactivity and the related notion of vested rights “played a central
role in the constitutional protection of property and contract rights

158. See supra Part II.A.1.
159. See supra Part II.A.1.
160. Professor Amsterdam puts the point sharply:
Yet it is evident that, unless the Court has been fooling itself in these cases, the
“scienter” meant must be some other kind of scienter than that traditionally known to
the common law—the knowing performance of an act with intent to bring about that
thing, whatever it is, which the statute proscribes, knowledge of the fact that it is so
proscribed being immaterial. Such scienter would clarify nothing; a clarificatory
“scienter” must envisage not only a knowing what is done but a knowing that what is
done is unlawful or, at least, so “wrong” that it is probably unlawful.
Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 87 n.98 (citation omitted).
161. See Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of
Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775, 775–76 (1936).
162. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801); Smead, supra
note 161, at 780–81 & n.22 (collecting cases).
163. See Smead, supra note 161, at 782. In its earlier formulation, the rule “had not included
those laws which divested rights vested antecedently to enactment in applying to cases arising
prospectively.” Id.
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164

before the late nineteenth century.” Through the start of the New
Deal era, the Court continued to reiterate the presumption against
165
166
retroactivity and to hold statutes impermissibly retroactive.
As the New Deal progressed, the Court’s stance toward
retroactivity evolved in conjunction with its treatment of the
Contracts Clause. In Contracts Clause jurisprudence, a critical turning
167
point was Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell. The Blaisdell
decision approved a scheme adopted by the state of Minnesota to
provide emergency relief to debtors by extending the period in which
the debtors could redeem property that would otherwise be
168
foreclosed on—in other words, a mortgage moratorium. A fivejustice majority of the Court reasoned that the Contracts Clause
posed no bar to legislation that was reasonably drawn to further an
appropriate legislative end: “The question is not whether the
legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or
indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end
and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that
169
end.”
Blaisdell did not mark a complete reversal of course in Contracts
Clause jurisprudence. In the two years following Blaisdell, the Court
did strike down statutes with similar effects to the Minnesota law in
which the challenged statutes were not tethered to the existence of
170
economic emergencies. By 1940, however, the Court had relaxed

164. James L. Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional Protection for
Property and Contract Rights, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 103 (1993).
165. See, e.g., Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 337 (1930) (“Ordinarily, statutes establish
rules for the future, and they will not be applied retrospectively unless that purpose plainly
appears.”); United States v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 276 U.S. 160, 162–63 (1928) (“Statutes are
not to be given retroactive effect or construed to change the status of claims fixed in accordance
with earlier provisions unless the legislative purpose so to do plainly appears.”). But it appears
that the presumption against retroactivity was not uniformly applied. See Ann Woolhandler,
Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1018 (2006) (citing
two exceptions).
166. See, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601–02 (1935)
(holding invalid a Kentucky statute that applied retroactively to preexisting mortgages).
167. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
168. Id. at 416–18, 447–48.
169. Id. at 438.
170. See Woolhandler, supra note 165, at 1050 nn.195–200; see also Cushman, supra note 6,
at 37 (“In the twenty-five months following the announcement of the Blaisdell decision, the
Court heard three cases involving challenges to state debtor relief legislation under the Contract
Clause. In each case, the Court invalidated the legislation by a unanimous vote.”).
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this limitation, holding in Veix v. 6th Ward Building & Loan Ass’n
that state legislation restricting sales of shares of building-and-loan
associations was valid regardless of the existence of conditions of
172
economic emergency. Five years later, the Court in East New York
173
Savings Bank v. Hahn
again upheld retroactive legislation
continuing a mortgage moratorium, despite the fact that it had no link
174
to conditions of economic emergency. In rejecting a retroactivity
challenge to a regulation some years later, the Court admonished that
“[i]mmunity from federal regulation is not gained through
forehanded contracts. Were it otherwise the paramount powers of
175
Congress could be nullified by ‘prophetic discernment.’”
The Court’s shift on Contracts Clause doctrine influenced its
treatment of retroactivity. With the demise of Contracts Clause
jurisprudence, challenges to a law’s substantive retroactivity came to
176
be analyzed within the rubric of due process. Under the categorical
approach of post-1938 due process jurisprudence, economic
legislation will withstand due process challenge if it bears some
rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. In this
calculation, the retroactive effects of legislation do not constitute a
177
reason for special scrutiny. Rather, retroactivity is merely “a factor

171. Veix v. 6th Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940).
172. Id. at 39 (“Many of the enactments were temporary in character. We are here
considering a permanent piece of legislation. So far as the contract clause is concerned, is this
significant? We think not. ‘Emergency does not create [constitutional] power, emergency may
furnish the occasion for the exercise of power.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Blaisdell, 290
U.S. at 426)).
173. E.N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945).
174. See id. at 232–34 (relying upon the “governing constitutional principle” that “the
authority of the State ‘to safeguard the vital interests of its people’” could not “be gainsaid by
abstracting [a private contract] from its public context and treating it as though it were an
isolated private contract constitutionally immune from impairment” (quoting Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
at 433)).
175. Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 107 (1947) (quoting Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374,
391 (1932)).
176. See Kainen, supra note 164, at 111–12 (“In contrast with the nineteenth century’s
emphasis on the vesting of rights, however, the typical modern approach considers the
retroactive application of statutes to be no more than a factor to be weighed in deciding whether
a particular interference with economic rights constitutes a violation of substantive due process.
Moreover, retroactivity has virtually no independent significance as a factor of consideration.”
(footnotes omitted)); see also DANIEL E. TROY, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION 64 (1998).
177. See Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1055, 1063–64 (1997) (explaining how, after the New Deal, the “erosion of the doctrine
of substantive due process curtailed any judicial inclination to subject retroactive legislation to
intensive scrutiny”).
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to be weighed in deciding whether a particular interference with
178
economic rights constitutes a violation of substantive due process.”
179
And it is a factor with “virtually no independent significance.”
Though the Court has occasionally implied that retroactive legislation
may be harder to sustain in the face of a due process challenge than
180
prospective legislation, it has also emphatically disclaimed that any
181
such greater burden exists.
An additional change deserves mention. In 1940, the Court held
that a past practice of regulation has relevance to the assessment of
182
whether a new law has impermissibly retroactive effect. This
183
principle took root over time. By holding that the foreseeability of

178. Kainen, supra note 164, at 111.
179. Id. at 111–12.
180. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1976) (“It does not
follow, however, that what Congress can legislate prospectively it can legislate retrospectively.
The retrospective aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of
due process, and the justifications for the latter may not suffice for the former.”).
181. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30 (1994) (“The ‘harsh and oppressive’
formulation, however, ‘does not differ from the prohibition against arbitrary and irrational
legislation’ that applies generally to enactments in the sphere of economic policy.” (quoting
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984))); Pension Benefit,
467 U.S. at 730 (“To be sure, we went on to recognize that retroactive legislation does have to
meet a burden not faced by legislation that has only future effects. . . . But that burden is met
simply by showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a
rational legislative purpose.”).
182. Veix v. 6th Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940) (“It was while statutory
requirements were in effect that petitioner purchased his shares. When he purchased into an
enterprise already regulated in the particular to which he now objects, he purchased subject to
further legislation upon the same topic.”). Veix provides the clearest statement of this idea,
though earlier cases contain perceptible hints at it. See, e.g., Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co.,
294 U.S. 240, 307–08 (1935) (“[W]hen contracts deal with a subject matter which lies within the
control of the Congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove their
transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts about
them.”).
183. See, e.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 413
(1983) (“The threshold determination is whether the [Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act,
1979 Kan. Sess. Laws 841 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-1401 to 55-1415 (Supp. 1982)),]
has impaired substantially [the petitioner’s] contractual rights. Significant here is the fact that
the parties are operating in a heavily regulated industry.”); Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Darlington,
Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958) (“Congress by the [Housing Act of 1954 (1954 Act), ch. 649, 68 Stat.
610 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.),] was doing no more than
protecting the regulatory system which it had designed. Those who do business in the regulated
field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve
the legislative end.”); Chrysler Corp. v. Kolosso Auto Sales, Inc., 148 F.3d 892, 895 (7th Cir.
1998) (“The centrality of foreseeability explains the courts’ emphasis, in deciding whether the
application of a new regulation violates the contracts clause, on the degree to which the activity
to which the contract pertains was already heavily regulated when the contract was made.”).

SOHONI IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1202

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/25/2013 12:13 PM

[Vol. 62:1169

regulation can, in essence, mitigate a law’s retroactive effects, the
Court has authorized a kind of regulatory piggybacking whereby the
existence of regulations with prospective effects can justify the
184
Retroactive
adoption of regulations with retroactive effects.
legislation can thus follow most readily when prospective regulation
can most readily be enacted—in the economic realm, where only
185
rational-basis review applies.
The Court would subsequently tie expressly its changing stance
on retroactive legislation to the New Deal revolution in constitutional
jurisprudence. In a 1958 case, in “what seemed almost a
186
peroration,” the Court rejected a retroactivity challenge on the
grounds that finding the statute impermissibly retroactive would
187
“make the ghost of Lochner v. New York walk again.” In Landgraf
188
the Court similarly noted that the
v. USI Film Products,
presumption against retroactivity “had special force in the era in
which courts tended to view legislative interference with property and
189
contract rights circumspectly.” The cumulative upshot has been
predictable: an unbroken record since the New Deal of sustaining
190
retroactive economic laws against due process challenges.
184. Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive
Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 700 (1960) (“The justification given for this sweeping
principle is that the parties are on notice that if the legislature has competence in a given field, it
may well exercise its powers, and therefore there is no unfair surprise when these powers are
exercised retroactively.”). Hochman criticizes the rule because “it in effect makes retroactivity
immaterial in determining the constitutionality of a statute; if the legislature could act as it did
by a statute which had prospective application only, it can make the statute apply to past
transactions.” Id.
185. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (describing standards for
rational-basis review of economic regulation).
186. Guido Calabresi, Retroactivity: Paramount Powers and Contractual Changes, 71 YALE
L.J. 1191, 1194 (1962).
187. Darlington, 358 U.S. at 91–92 (1958) (citations omitted); see also id. (“Congress by the
1954 Act was doing no more than protecting the regulatory system which it had designed. Those
who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by
subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end.” (citation omitted)).
188. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
189. Id. at 272.
190. See Andrew C. Weiler, Note, Has Due Process Struck Out? The Judicial
Rubberstamping of Retroactive Economic Laws, 42 DUKE L.J. 1069, 1071–72 (1993)
(“Significantly, since the origination of the tax deference doctrine in 1938, the Supreme Court
not only has never sustained a due process challenge to the retroactive application of a tax law,
but, more remarkably, has not sustained a due process challenge to any retroactive economic
law.” (footnotes omitted)). In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), a four-Justice
plurality of the Court invalidated the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act, 26 U.S.C. §§
9701–9722 (1994 & Supp. II 1997), as a regulatory taking, with Justice Kennedy concurring in
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C. The Rule of Lenity
The rule of lenity is a canon of statutory construction rooted in
191
common-law doctrine. The rule “directs courts to construe statutory
192
ambiguities in favor of criminal defendants.” One of the “classic
193
rationales” for the rule is the notice theory. On this theory, the rule
of lenity provides a degree of “assurance that no criminal defendants
will be caught off guard by broader statutory interpretations than
194
they could reasonably anticipate.” Although some commentators
195
have objected that “criminals do not read statutes,” the principle of
notice continues to be accepted as a chief reason for construing
196
criminal statutes narrowly.
At the time of the New Deal, commentators were less than
197
enamored of the rule of lenity. In 1935, one influential author wrote
198
that the rule should be sharply limited. Another author argued that
the rule stood in the way of reform-oriented theories of punishment
199
focused on incapacitation and deterrence. On this view, the rule of
200
lenity was one species of judicial “quibble” and “casuistry” designed

the judgment and dissenting in part, Apfel, 524 U.S. at 503–04, 539. Justice Kennedy would have
invalidated the statute on due process retroactivity grounds. Id. at 547–50 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
191. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 358
(“Although [United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820),] was the first Supreme
Court decision to apply strict construction [of penal statutes], the rule did have a well
established history in English law.”).
192. Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 885
(2004).
193. Id. at 886.
194. Id.
195. E.g., id.
196. Narrowing prosecutorial discretion is another rationale sometimes advanced for the
rule of lenity. See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 600 (1992).
197. This view would later change. See Kahan, supra note 191, at 349 (“Lenity is almost
universally celebrated among commentators.”).
198. See Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. REV.
748, 762–63 (1935) (“[T]here is no sound reason for a general doctrine of strict construction of
penal statutes, and prima facie all such should have as liberal a construction as statutes
generally . . . .”).
199. See JOHN BARKER WAITE, THE CRIMINAL LAW IN ACTION 320 (1934); see also Francis
A. Allen, The Erosion of Legality in American Criminal Justice: Some Latter-Day Adventures of
the Nulla Poena Principle, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 385, 400 nn.59, 62 (1987) (citing WAITE, supra, at
16, 320).
200. WAITE, supra note 199, at 320.
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to nullify legislative intent: “[F]or a century or more it has been the
policy of the judiciary—a policy now gradually changing—to utilize
casuistic plausibility or any dubiety of the situation for the benefit of
201
the accused rather than for the immediate safety of society.”
These views ultimately found their way on the Court. As
Professor Lawrence Solan has pointed out, the arrival of Justice
Frankfurter to the Supreme Court in 1939 changed the Supreme
202
Court’s treatment of the rule of lenity. The change occurred in an
indirect way: by means of altering the rule of lenity’s priority as an
203
interpretive principle.
Traditionally, the rule of lenity meant that “[c]ourts interpreted
criminal statutes narrowly . . . , but to the extent that the dispute was
over the meaning of a statutory word, limited investigation occurred
204
into the legislature’s intended meaning of that word.” But Justice
Frankfurter did not agree with the long-honored rule coined by Chief
Justice Marshall that “probability is not a guide which a court, in
205
construing a penal statute, can safely take.” Rather, as Professor
Solan puts it, Justice Frankfurter was functioning within a new
“interpretive culture” under which courts considered legislative
history and other materials beyond the text of the statute prior to
determining that the statute was ambiguous and that the rule of lenity
206
required invocation. On Frankfurter’s view, “lenity was not as much
about language as it was about residual uncertainty after careful

201. Id. at 16; see also id. at 320 (“[I]f once the whole idea of punishment be discarded and
the objective of every prosecution be recognized as the removal of a particular social danger,
the public attitude must inevitably change. Indeed, the adoption of the new objective will be
possible only when that attitude does change. In the light of that purpose, quibble, casuistry,
technicality in the fabrication of ‘rights’, will no longer seem legitimate defenses in a contest, but
must appear in their true character as obstacles to the progress of social prophylaxis.”).
202. Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 102–08
(1998).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 96.
205. Id. at 105 (“Marshall’s position in Wiltberger that ‘probability is not a guide which a
court, in construing a penal statute, can safely take,’ was reprehensible to Frankfurter, who had
no interest in using lenity to thwart clear legislative intent.” (citation omitted) (quoting United
States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 105 (1820)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 283 (1943) (condemning “the notion that
criminal statutes must be construed by some artificial and conventional rule” (quoting United
States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 55. (1909)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
206. Solan, supra note 202, at 107.
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207

study.” This “vision of lenity differed sharply from the traditional
208
one.”
209
Thus reformulated, the rule of lenity began to lose its bite. In
210
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., the Court characterized the rule
of lenity as one of those rules of statutory construction that “come
down to us from sources that were hostile toward the legislative
process itself and thought it generally wise to restrict the operation of
211
an act to its narrowest permissible compass.” As the Court went on
to admonish, such rules of statutory construction were
subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe the details of
an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read
text in the light of context and will interpret the text so far as the
meaning of the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular
212
cases the generally expressed legislative policy.”

The next year, the Court noted that the rule of lenity had no
weight when its application would cause “distortion or nullification of

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Compare, e.g., United States v. Harris, 177 U.S. 305, 309 (1900) (relying on the rule of
lenity to reject an argument that a “company” included persons acting on that company’s behalf
(internal quotation marks omitted)), with, e.g., Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 283 (rejecting
application of the rule of lenity and holding that a statute that imposed liability on a
“corporation” imposed liability on that corporation’s responsible officers).
210. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
211. Id. at 350.
212. Id. at 350–51. Another traditional rule of statutory construction—the rule that statutes
in derogation of the common law will be strictly construed—was also criticized by
contemporaneous observers as evincing judicial mistrust of legislatures. As one of these
observers wrote, “The exemption of the time-honored common law from the requirement of
definiteness indicates that, at bottom, the doctrine springs from a lack of confidence in the
legislatures.” Indefinite Criteria of Definiteness in Statutes, supra note 58, at 163; see also id. at
161–63 & nn.9, 20–23 (collecting cases). In 1936, in the heart of the legal controversies over the
New Deal, Justice Harlan Stone criticized the strict construction rule as an “ancient shibboleth”
that had no place in interpreting “statutes establishing administrative agencies and defining
their powers.” Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18
(1936). The role of courts, he wrote, was to help agencies in carrying out legislative schemes, not
to hamper them: “[T]he function which courts are called upon to perform, in carrying into
operation such administrative schemes, is constructive, not destructive, to make administrative
agencies, wherever reasonably possible, effective instruments for law enforcement, and not to
destroy them.” Id. Sutherland, citing Stone, states that “[m]odern regulatory legislation” is not
subject to the antiderogation rule and will instead “receive[] liberal construction,” because such
legislation creates “a newly conceived system of legal arrangements to deal with emergent
problems in society.” NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 3 SUTHERLAND ON
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 61:3 (6th ed. 2007).
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Soon
the evident meaning and purpose of the legislation.”
thereafter, the Court again emphasized judicial deference, holding
that the rule of lenity could override neither “common sense” nor
214
“evident statutory purpose.”
These pronouncements eventually matured into the “doctrinal
formulation that has now become dominant”—that “a court may
properly conclude that a statute is ‘ambiguous’ for purposes of lenity
only ‘after seizing everything from which aid can be derived,’
including ‘the language and structure, legislative history, and
215
motivating policies’ of the statute.” As Professor Dan Kahan has
pointed out, however, “[r]anking lenity ‘last’ among interpretive
216
conventions all but guarantees its irrelevance.” The New Deal era
commenced the line of cases that would demote the rule of lenity to
217
this low point on the totem pole.
D. Summary
As this Part has shown, the New Deal era saw the Court
transform the standards for due process notice doctrine in a variety of
ways. The Court altered its practices with respect to facial vagueness
attacks, reduced the clarity it would demand of civil economic laws,

213. United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527, 529–30 (1944) (“The appellee invokes the rule
that criminal laws are to be strictly construed and defendants are not to be convicted under
statutes too vague to apprise the citizen of the nature of the offense. That principle, however,
does not require distortion or nullification of the evident meaning and purpose of the
legislation.”).
214. United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25–26 (1948) (“The canon in favor of strict
construction is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory
purpose. It does not require magnified emphasis upon a single ambiguous word in order to give
it a meaning contradictory to the fair import of the whole remaining language.”).
215. Kahan, supra note 191, at 386 (alterations omitted) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 347 (1971)); see also Marie Gryphon, The Better Part of Lenity, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
717, 720–21 (2011) (“The current majority view [among courts] might appropriately be called
the ‘lenity last’ view. . . . ‘Lenity last’ is a seldom used, last ditch tiebreaker, invoked only when
every other clue to the legislature’s intent has been examined without success.”).
216. Kahan, supra note 191, at 386; see also Allen, supra note 199, at 398 (concluding that
“the idea of strict interpretation has suffered significant erosion in the present century”).
217. The current Court has tended to require a “grievous ambiguity” in the statute before
the rule of lenity may apply. See, e.g., Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2009) (“To
invoke the rule [of lenity], we must conclude that there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in
the statute.” (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1089 (2009) (holding that
the rule of lenity did not apply because the statute at issue was not “grievously ambiguous”
(alterations omitted) (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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and began to treat mens rea requirements as a substitute for clarity in
the legislative language of criminal statutes. In concert with these
changes, it altered its treatment of retroactivity and the rule of lenity.
One curious fact about these changes is the rather sub rosa
manner in which they have occurred, at least in comparison to other
famous New Deal doctrinal changes. A quick-and-dirty
demonstration of this discrepancy is easy to make. If one looks up on
Westlaw the cases famously associated with the pre-New Deal
218
doctrines—Lochner v. New York, Tipaldo, Adkins, Hammer v.
219
Dagenhart, and so forth—they are for the most part “red flagged.”
The cases from the old regime are visibly acknowledged to be no
longer good law, because they have been overturned by their
counterparts after the “switch in time”—NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
220
221
Steel Corp., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, and so forth. In
contrast, many important pre-New Deal cases that stated principles of
due process notice doctrine that are now effectively defunct—for
example, Connally and Small—are not “red flagged” in Westlaw.
They have not been branded as “bad law.” But they have utterly
different practical, real-world consequences from what they once had.
When due process notice doctrine is concerned, then, the New
Deal’s break with past practice is neither loudly proclaimed nor easily
recognized, though it was quite as sharp. With apologies to T.S.
222
Eliot, sometimes the law changes not with a bang, but a whisper.
III. THE BUFFER’S SIGNIFICANCE
The New Deal was a multifaceted political project with a goal no
223
less ambitious than the transformation of American society. As
such, the New Deal necessarily implicated certain central doctrines of
constitutional law. The New Deal could not go forward without the
Supreme Court’s acquiescence in the federal government’s increased
224
power. Nor could it go forward without the Court’s acquiescence in

218. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
219. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
220. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
221. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
222. Cf. T.S. ELIOT, The Hollow Men, in POEMS: 1909–1925, at 123, 128 (Harcourt, Brace &
Co. 1932) (1925) (“This is the way the world ends/Not with a bang but a whimper.”).
223. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 254.
224. See id. at 253–54 (“The original understanding of a sharply constrained central
government was therefore repudiated by the nation. . . . [S]tate autonomy seemed an obstacle to
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a generous understanding of the boundaries of congressional
225
authority to delegate to federal administrative agencies. Nor could
it go forward without the Court’s acquiescence in the erosion of the
226
protections for liberty of contract. The fact that these doctrines
changed during the New Deal, then, is not hard to understand; these
were all legal issues that the implementation of the New Deal, by
227
necessity, staged for the Court’s resolution.
Against this backdrop, the changes in due process notice
doctrine identified in the preceding discussion make a rather jarring
appearance. In contrast to the more famous doctrinal changes that
occurred in this period, alterations to due process notice were not
demanded by the New Deal’s political project—at least, not in any
straightforward sense—either as a matter of jurisprudence or as a
matter of politics.
Jurisprudentially, questions of due process notice operate on a
different plane than the other elements of New Deal constitutional
change. At the heart of due process notice doctrine sits the basic
principle that individuals have the right to know the meaning of the

democratic self-government, not a crucial part of it—especially in the midst of the Depression,
when states were generally perceived as ineffectual entities buffeted by private factions.”).
225. See THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 132–33 (1st ed. 1969) (explaining the need for broad delegations
as administrative components were added to the government).
226. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 423 (describing the New Deal view that the common law
accorded “excessive protection [to] established property interests and insufficient protection
[to] the interests of the poor, the elderly, and the unemployed”).
227. This Article does not take a position in the spirited academic exchange on whether
these doctrinal changes occurred purely because of the Court-packing threat or for other
reasons. The point is only that these constitutional issues were questions presented in
straightforward fashion by the New Deal’s political agenda. A wealth of scholarship addresses
the empirical accuracy of the so-called “switch-in-time” narrative. See, e.g., Barry Cushman,
Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201 (1994); see also WHITE, supra note 5, at 203;
Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69, 71
(2010). These debates “center on the question whether the Supreme Court shifted ground in
response to the direct threat to its independence embodied in the Court-packing proposal, or
whether there is another less political explanation for the Court’s doctrinal change,” a question
that many of the debaters themselves concede “is probably unanswerable.” Barry Friedman,
The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
971, 976 (2000). For a persuasive argument that the Court-packing plan had no durable
consequences upon the Court’s performance as a majoritarian institution, see Richard H. Pildes,
Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 132. According to
Pildes, “[O]ne can read the 1937 experience as suggesting that, for better or worse, judicial
independence and the authority of the Court have become so entrenched in America that even
the most popular politicians play with fire if they seek too directly to take on the power of the
Court.” Id.
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laws that govern them. This is a rule-of-law value, a value that can
be honored or dishonored independently of the substantive shape of a
legal regime. Logically speaking, vigorous protection of due process
notice is compatible with many different patterns of substantive
policy; there is no reason why judicial deference to the substance of
the New Deal project should have demanded judicial deference on
the acceptable degree of linguistic clarity of civil and criminal laws
and regulations. Judicial review of legislative specificity and
prospectivity need not move in rigid lockstep with judicial review of
policy.
Politically, the link between due process notice and the New
Deal project appears even more attenuated. Both elite and popular
opinion at the time were riveted by the highly salient question of
whether the New Deal’s programs would stand or fall, not by the
secondary question of how much specificity the Court was demanding
of legislative language, much less by the tertiary question of what
methods of statutory construction the Court was using to determine
230
the presence or absence of legislative clarity. The Court’s habit of
pairing its vagueness holdings with economic liberty or delegation
231
holdings no doubt helped to obscure its notice jurisprudence; then,
and indeed now, readers of these opinions naturally train their fire on
the more controversial substantive holdings rather than on the
twinned vagueness holdings. When crowds in Ames, Iowa, hanged in
232
effigy six sitting Supreme Court justices in 1936, their anger was
presumably not ignited by the Court’s vagueness jurisprudence.
What, then, drove the changes in due process notice doctrine
that occurred in this period? Why did the Court quietly cede so much
of the terrain over which it was previously willing to enforce
constitutional constraints?

228. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 (1997) (noting Justice Holmes’s
description of the constitutional necessity of “fair warning . . . in language that the common
world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed” (alteration in
original) (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)) (internal quotation mark
omitted)).
229. See FULLER, supra note 11, at 39.
230. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT, THE POLITICS OF
UPHEAVAL 490 (1960) (“If the New Deal legislation were all nullified, the President said
somberly, there would be marching farmers and marching miners and marching workingmen
throughout the land.”); Friedman, supra note 227, at 980–82 (collecting sources describing the
“tremendous popular engagement” provoked by “the New Deal fight”).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 61–73.
232. SCHLESINGER, supra note 230, at 488.
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The simple reason is that the Court ultimately came to the view
that its newly emergent stance of judicial deference on matters of
policy required deference on the facets of due process notice
doctrine. This answer has been alluded to already, but it is worth
setting out at length because this result was by no means a foregone
conclusion.
The cases addressing vagueness best illustrate the choice faced
by the Court. The battle between the Court’s members centered on
the question of whether vagueness doctrine should be ratcheted up in
stringency, or ratcheted down, in response to the new sorts of laws
being enacted in the New Deal period. One side took the view that
the novelty of the New Deal’s legislative program made it incumbent
on the Court to police legislative drafting with extra vigilance to
prevent unfair surprise to regulated parties. The other took the view
that the degree of clarity or ambiguity in legislative drafting was itself
a choice that the legislature has the prerogative to make and to which
the Court must defer. Indeed, some members of the Court regarded
the argument for legislative deference as so forceful that they
believed it ought to apply even in the context of First Amendment
vagueness challenges.
An elaboration of the first of these contrasting visions is the
dissent in Petrillo, a case in which the Court rejected a vagueness
233
challenge to a provision of the Communications Act of 1934 that
made it unlawful to use or threaten force to coerce licensees to hire
more employees than “needed by such licensee to perform actual
234
services.” The defendant contended that there was no way to know
235
how many employees were “needed” for a given job. Although
admitting that “[c]learer and more precise language might have been
framed by Congress to express what it meant by ‘number of
employees needed,’” the Court noted that “none occurs to us, nor has
any better language been suggested, effectively to carry out what
236
appears to have been the Congressional purpose.” The Petrillo
dissent complained that the statute was part and parcel of a novel

233. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
234. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 3 (1947) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 506 (repealed 1980))
(quotation marks omitted).
235. Id. at 7.
236. Id.
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legislative program that required stronger judicial enforcement of
vagueness: the act was
one of the many regulatory acts that legislative bodies have passed
in recent years to make unlawful certain practices in the field of
economics that seemed contrary to the public interest. These
statutes made new crimes. . . . Common experience has not created a
general understanding of their criminality. Consequently, . . . a more
237
precise definition of the crime is necessary.

In sum, the Petrillo dissent argued that the novelty of New Deal
statutory law required the Court to adopt a more vigilant stance
toward policing legislative draftsmanship to shield the rights to notice
238
of individuals newly regulated by these laws.
The second of these contrasting visions is most comprehensively
239
elaborated in Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Winters v. New York, a
240
First Amendment vagueness case. In Winters, the Court struck
down as vague a New York statute that prohibited dissemination of
241
obscene materials. Justice Frankfurter’s dissent complained that the
Court was using vagueness as a ruse to supersede New York’s valid
policy choices:
The painful experience which resulted from confusing economic
dogmas with constitutional edicts ought not to be repeated by
finding constitutional barriers to a State’s policy regarding
crime . . . . This Court is not ready, I assume, to pronounce on
causative factors of mental disturbance and their relation to crime.
Without formally professing to do so, it may actually do so by

237. Id. at 16–17 & n.1 (Reed, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citing such measures as the
National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
151–169 (2006)), the FLSA, and the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 25, 56 Stat. 33
(codified as amended at U.S.C. app. §§ 901–946 (Supp. V 1946))).
238. Id.; see also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 634 (1954) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(“Whoever kidnaps, steals, kills, or commits similar acts of violence upon another is bound to
know that he is inviting retribution by society, and many of the statutes which define these longestablished crimes are traditionally and perhaps necessarily vague. But we are dealing with a
novel offense that has no established bounds and no such normal basis. The criminality of the
conduct dealt with here depends entirely upon a purpose to influence legislation. . . . [I]t is an
area where legal penalties should be applied only by formulae as precise and clear as our
language will permit.”).
239. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
240. Id. at 527 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 519 (majority opinion).
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invalidating legislation dealing with these problems as too
242
“indefinite.”

On the dissent’s view, legislative judgment on the clarity or
specificity of language “involves an exercise of judgment which is at
243
the heart of the legislative process.” The vagueness challenge
amounted to a request for the Court to “declare void the law which
expresses the balance so struck by the legislature, on the ground that
244
the legislature has not expressed its policy clearly enough.” Evoking
the specter of Lochner, he admonished against “subtly supplant[ing]”
245
legislative judgment with judicial judgment.
246
In the rule-of-lenity area, United States v. Dotterweich offers a
parallel example of these contrasting visions. Dotterweich was a case
addressing the liability of corporate executives for regulatory offenses
247
committed by the corporations for which they worked. The Court’s
opinion was suffused with references to the need for courts to read
the statute in light of the policy ends sought to be achieved by
Congress, rather than in light of the rule of lenity:
248

The purposes of [the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ] thus
touch phases of the lives and health of people which, in the
circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond selfprotection. Regard for these purposes should infuse construction of
the legislation if it is to be treated as a working instrument of
249
government and not merely as a collection of English words.

The dissent objected strenuously to this approach, contending
that the rule of lenity forbade reading the statute to extend liability to

242. Id. at 527 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 533.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 537.
246. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
247. See Norman Abrams, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability
Offenses—A Comment on Dotterweich and Park, 28 UCLA L. REV. 463, 463 (1981).
Dotterweich is frequently credited as the font of the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine, a
theory of criminal liability that has caused much scholarly debate, in particular because modern
federal and state environmental statutes have incorporated this theory in their provisions for
criminal liability. See Todd S. Aagaard, A Fresh Look at the Responsible Relation Doctrine, 96 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1245, 1264 (2006).
248. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 653, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 301–392 (1940)).
249. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280.
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the corporate officer. In the dissent’s view, deference to legislative
250
judgment instead required dismissing the indictment.
With respect to one facet of retroactivity doctrine, the Chenery
cases lucidly illustrate the same tug-of-war over the proper
251
implementation of deference. The Chenery lawsuits arose from a
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) order concerning the
252
approval of a reorganization plan for a public utilities company. In
the course of deciding whether to approve the reorganization plan
proposed by the Chenerys for one such firm, the agency announced a
new rule applicable to such reorganizations: that officers and
directors of the company could not engage in stock purchases while
253
the reorganization was pending. After remanding once for the
254
agency to state adequate grounds for its determination,
the
255
Supreme Court sustained the SEC’s order in the subsequent appeal.
In this second decision, Chenery II, the question of retroactivity was
squarely posed: the agency had created and applied a new rule of law
in the course of adjudicating the Chenery case, and the challengers
256
contended that this maneuver exceeded the agency’s authority.
257
The Chenery II majority disagreed and sustained the order.
The Court based its holding nearly entirely on considerations of
administrative “experience” and deference to “informed, expert
258
judgment.”
To the majority, “the argument of retroactivity”
amounted to “nothing more than a claim that the [agency] lacks
259
power to enforce the standards of the Act in this proceeding” —a
claim that could not prevail. On the majority’s view, the Court was
obliged to refrain from “stultify[ing] the administrative process” by

250. See id. at 292–93 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“Reliance on the legislature to define crimes
and criminals distinguishes our form of jurisprudence from certain less desirable ones.”).
251. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (Chenery II); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318
U.S. 80 (1943) (Chenery I). I am indebted to Ron Levin for this insight.
252. See Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 81–82.
253. Id. at 84–85.
254. Id. at 94–95 (“The Commission’s action cannot be upheld merely because findings
might have been made and considerations disclosed which would justify its order as an
appropriate safeguard for the interests protected by the Act. There must be such a responsible
finding.”).
255. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 209.
256. Id. at 199–200.
257. Id. at 200.
258. Id. at 199, 207.
259. Id. at 203–04.
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imposing a “rigid requirement” that an agency formulate new
260
standards of conduct prospectively, by rule.
This result provoked an outraged dissent from Justice Jackson,
261
who was joined by Justice Frankfurter. Unmoved by the majority’s
262
repeated appeals to administrative deference, the dissent excoriated
the Court for adopting the position that “[t]he Commission must be
sustained because of its accumulated experience in solving a problem
263
with which it had never before been confronted!” The argument for
deference, the dissent wrote, can properly apply only where an
agency is exercising discretion “under and within the law” and
264
“cannot be invoked to support action outside of the law.” Asserting
265
that the majority was condoning retroactive lawmaking, the dissent
concluded by accusing the Court of approving “administrative
authoritarianism,” or the “power to decide without law”—a result
that “undervalue[d] and . . . belittle[d] the place of law, even in the
266
system of administrative justice.”
As these judicial contests reflect, a struggle over how to
implement the philosophy of judicial deference was being waged in
the cases that drove the doctrinal evolution of due process notice
during this era. The ethos that ultimately carried the day treats
matters of notice as inherently political and treats judicial policing of

260. Id. at 202–03 (“[T]he agency must retain power to deal with the problems on a case-tocase basis if the administrative process is to be effective. . . . And the choice made between
proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the
informed discretion of the administrative agency.”).
261. Id. at 213 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
262. See id. at 212–13 (“[W]e peruse the Court’s opinion diligently to find on what grounds
it is now held that the Court of Appeals, on pain of being reversed for error, was required to
stamp this order with its approval. We find but one. That is the principle of judicial deference to
administrative experience. That argument is five times stressed in as many different
contexts . . . .”).
263. Id. at 213.
264. Id. at 215. To excuse an agency from the obligation to have an existing rule of law to
support its order, the dissent complained, would render futile the process of judicial review. See
id. at 214 (“If it is of no consequence that no rule of law be existent to support an administrative
order, and the Court of Appeals is obliged to defer to administrative experience and to sustain a
Commission’s power merely because it has been asserted and exercised, of what use is it to print
a record or briefs in the case, or to hear argument? Administrative experience always is present,
at least to the degree that it is here, and would always dictate a like deference by this Court to
an assertion of administrative power.”).
265. See id. at 213 (“Of course, thus to uphold the Commission by professing to find that it
has enunciated a ‘new standard of conduct’ brings the Court squarely against the invalidity of
retroactive law-making. But the Court does not falter.” (quoting id. at 203 (majority opinion)).
266. Id. at 216–17.
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matters of notice as undemocratic judicial intrusion. An analogy can
be drawn to Professor Cass Sunstein’s oft-repeated (though sharply
267
contested ) claim that a central insight of the New Deal Court was its
recognition that common-law rights were not naturally determined,
268
but were instead a result of legislative preferences. Just as the Court
came to regard allocations of rights as inherently matters of legislative
choice rather than prepolitical entitlements, so did it come to
embrace the view that legislative and regulatory clarity and
prospectivity are inherently matters of legislative or administrative
choice rather than abstract values that courts can reliably police in a
269
vacuum. Under this “rational-basis style” review, the degree of
clarity or prospectivity of legislation and regulation was a matter
appropriately left to legislative and administrative discretion, just as
substantive policy choices in economic matters were to be left to
legislative and administrative discretion—and judicial interference on
either score was equally illegitimate.
Much has turned on the outcome of this contest. The most
important consequence of the winners’ approach has been its
significant but underappreciated influence on the mechanics of
lawmaking. Because the Constitution requires bicameralism and
270
presentment, enacting federal legislation is a resource-intensive
affair. The bicameralism and presentment requirements “make it
271
more difficult for factions to usurp legislative authority.” They
“promote caution and deliberation[] by mandating that each piece of
legislation clear an intricate process involving distinct constitutional

267. See David Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 22–26 (2003)
(criticizing Sunstein’s conclusions).
268. See Cass Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987) (arguing that
in the Lochner era “[m]arket ordering under the common law was understood to be a part of
nature rather than a legal construct”); id. at 903 (“But Lochner was wrongly decided, and one of
the reasons that it was wrong is that it depended on baselines and consequent understandings of
action and neutrality that were inappropriate for constitutional analysis. The New Deal to a
large degree rejected those understandings . . . .”).
269. The seminal cases on rational-basis review and equal protection handed down in the
same period held that legislative solutions to economic problems were constitutionally valid,
even if they were partial and imperfect. See, e.g., Ry. Exp. Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,
110 (1949) (“The local authorities may well have concluded that those who advertise their own
wares on their trucks do not present the same traffic problem in view of the nature or extent of
the advertising which they use. . . . It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the
same genus be eradicated or none at all.”).
270. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
271. John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 708
(1997).

SOHONI IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1216

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/25/2013 12:13 PM

[Vol. 62:1169

272

And, finally, they encourage “conflict and friction,
actors.”
enhancing the prospects for a full and open discussion of matters of
273
public import.” These dynamics were intentional; the Founders
deliberately “raise[d] the decision costs associated with lawmaking,
safeguarding liberty through a deliberate sacrifice of governmental
274
efficiency.”
In this calculus, stringent due process notice requirements
operate to raise the costs of enacting legislation by requiring
congressional lawmakers and the president to reach agreement on
more precise legislative terms. For the same reason that rules are
275
costlier to enact than standards, precise laws are costlier to enact
than vague laws. Professor Sunstein has made an overlapping point
about nondelegation doctrine: “Simply by virtue of requiring
legislators to agree on a relatively specific form of words, the
nondelegation principle seems to raise the burdens and costs
276
associated with the enactment of federal law.”
Stringent
requirements of clarity and specificity thus act as an across-the-board
check on all legislative activity. Conversely, loosening the
requirement of legislative specificity—as the Court did through its
due process notice jurisprudence—has the opposite effect: it
facilitates the exercise of legislative power by enabling the passage of
more statutes as well as the passage of statutes that are more vaguely
277
worded.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 709.
274. Id. at 709–10; see also id. at 710 (quoting Madison’s view that “‘the facility and excess of
law-making’ and not the converse, ‘seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most
liable’” and Hamilton’s view that “[t]he injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few
good laws will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones”
(alteration in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961); and id. NO. 73, at 444 (Alexander Hamilton)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
275. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
562–63 (1992) (“Rules are more costly to promulgate than standards because rules involve
advance determinations of the law’s content, whereas standards are more costly for legal
advisors to predict or enforcement authorities to apply because they require later
determinations of the law’s content.”).
276. See Sunstein, supra note 61, at 320.
277. Cf. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2288 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We face
a Congress that puts forth an ever-increasing volume of laws in general, and of criminal laws in
particular. It should be no surprise that as the volume increases, so do the number of imprecise
laws. And no surprise that our indulgence of imprecisions that violate the Constitution
encourages imprecisions that violate the Constitution. Fuzzy, leave-the-details-to-be-sorted-outby-the-courts legislation is attractive to the Congressman who wants credit for addressing a
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This is a distinct, and hitherto unacknowledged, means by which
the Court in the New Deal era secured and enhanced legislative and
executive power generally and federal power in particular. The New
Deal reformulation of due process is thus not only a tale about how
the Court retooled its attitude toward the rule-of-law values of
statutory clarity and prospectivity. Rather, it is also a tale about how
the Court’s jurisprudence greased the gears of legislative compromise
and made it easier to enact laws of almost any variety, thereby giving
a diffuse boost to the project of building the modern regulatory state.
The New Deal constitutionalism of due process notice renders visible
a Court coming to embrace, and indeed manipulate, the principle that
methods of policing language are methods of allocating political
power among the branches. Understanding this dynamic is
worthwhile in its own right; it is also helpful because—as the next
Part will address—it contextualizes doctrinal disturbances that are
presently in progress.
IV. THE BUFFER’S DURABILITY
Seventy-five years on, the New Deal is still very much a ripe
278
source of controversy. The Supreme Court’s decision in June 2012
on the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
279
Act is just the latest and most pointed reminder that core aspects of
280
the New Deal “settlement” are today vulnerable.
In all this ferment and flux, one can start with a basic question:
What stature does the New Deal reformulation of due process notice
have? In Professor Bruce Ackerman’s provocative but convenient
terminology, did the New Deal constitutional “amendment”

national problem but does not have the time (or perhaps the votes) to grapple with the nittygritty. In the field of criminal law, at least, it is time to call a halt.”).
278. For some prominent and contrasting assessments, see, for example, 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 279 (1998); Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional
Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 459 (1989); Richard Epstein, The Mistakes of
1937, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 5, 5 (1988); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994); and Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text
and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1299 (1995).
279. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (amended).
280. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (stating that the minimumcoverage provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act violated the Commerce
Clause but could be sustained as a tax, and invalidating the conditional expansion of Medicare
as impermissibly coercive under the Spending Clause).
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281

encompass the law of due process notice? What would it mean to
say that such an amendment occurred, when its occurrence went
unheralded by contemporaneous observers and unremarked in
282
popular commentary?
Should these changes have the same
indefinite doctrinal shelf life that (until recently) one has assumed
that the other changes to constitutional doctrine made in this period
will enjoy?
One cannot grapple with these questions without coming to
terms with the possibility that these changes in due process
jurisprudence were a kind of a jurisprudential accident. A grand
social experiment—the administrative state—was incubating, and the
newly arrived Justices were inclined to shield it. The Justices were
under pressure to restore the institutional legitimacy of judicial
review from allegations of lingering Lochnerism. In short, the Court
in this era was bending over backward to accommodate legislative
judgment. The sense is hard to avoid that in some respects the Court
may have bent a bit further than was strictly necessary. The New Deal
reformulation of due process notice jurisprudence might simply have
been a kind of overcorrection of constitutional course.
Once a pendulum swings too far in one direction, it swings back.
The plausibility of the overcorrection account is buttressed by current
judicial contests over the boundaries of due process notice and over
the appropriate role of federal courts in shielding notice values from
impermissible exertions of legislative and executive power.
In criminal law, the rule of lenity has shown some recent signs of
283
vitality after its extended period of quiescence. On vagueness, a new
284
Skilling
and prominent example is Skilling v. United States.

281. See ACKERMAN, supra note 278.
282. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 254 n.23 (“The idea of a constitutional moment should, I
think, be seen as a metaphor, connoting large-scale change spurred by popular wishes, rather
than as a genuine constitutional amendment.”).
283. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (plurality opinion) (applying the
rule of lenity to construe the term “proceeds” in the federal money-laundering statute to cover
“profits,” not “gross receipts”); The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 276, 475–76 (2008) (“Many modern judges and scholars either write off lenity as a
dormant doctrine or theorize that its scope has gradually condensed to preventing only the
criminalization of innocent conduct. Last Term, in United States v. Santos, [128 S. Ct. 2020
(2008),] the Supreme Court began reversing that trend. . . . By turning to lenity as its first point
of analysis and strictly construing a statutory term whose broader construction could only have
added additional penalties to a preexisting conviction, the Court began reversing the
contraction of lenity and revitalizing a crucial protection for defendants.”).
284. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
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concerned the federal “honest services” statute, which expressly
stated that the mail and wire fraud statutes prohibited efforts to
285
deprive others of “the intangible right of honest services.” For
decades, as hundreds of federal prosecutions proceeded under this
provision, “the criminal defense bar, some academics, and some
federal judges (who remained dissenters only) complained that the
new statute did not provide constitutionally sufficient notice of what
conduct it criminalized and that it criminalized nonblameworthy
286
287
behavior.” After repeatedly denying certiorari on this question,
288
the Court agreed to hear Skilling’s appeal in 2009. In a decision that
greatly narrowed the statute’s scope, the Court held that the law had
to be construed to prohibit only bribery and kickback schemes to
289
avoid vagueness problems. In addition, “the majority went so far as
taking the extraordinary step of warning Congress in a footnote that
any effort to expand the mail fraud statute further would have to
290
navigate through perilous constitutional shoals” —the shoals of
291
vagueness. The dissent, meanwhile, argued for striking the statute
292
entirely, also on vagueness grounds. All nine Justices, then, agreed
that this federal criminal statute was too vague to be enforced as it
293
was written.
285. Id. at 2907; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
286. Samuel W. Buell, The Court’s Fraud Dud, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 31, 34
(2011).
287. See, e.g., United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1308 (2009).
288. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 393 (2009).
289. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2907 (“Construing the honest services statute to extend beyond
that core meaning, we conclude, would encounter a vagueness shoal. We therefore hold that
§ 1346 covers only bribery and kickback schemes.”).
290. Buell, supra note 286, at 36.
291. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2933 n.44 (“If Congress were to take up the enterprise of
criminalizing ‘undisclosed self-dealing by a public official or private employee,’ it would have to
employ standards of sufficient definiteness and specificity to overcome due process concerns.”
(citation omitted) (quoting Brief for the United States at 43, Skilling, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (No. 081394), 2010 WL 302206, at *43)); supra note 289.
292. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2935 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
293. The vagueness debate between the majority and the dissent in Skilling is a pure rehash
of the debates that occurred during the New Deal period on how best to accommodate
vagueness doctrine with deference to the legislature’s choices. The Skilling majority channeled
the attitude of Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 520 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting), by asserting that its narrow construction of the statute preserved
the legislative prerogative: “[T]he Court does not legislate, but instead respects the legislature, by
preserving a statute through a limiting interpretation.” Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931 n.43 (majority
opinion). The Skilling dissent, echoing the Dotterweich dissent, United States v. Dotterweich, 320
U.S. 277, 285 (1943) (Murphy, J., dissenting), contended that true deference to legislative
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Due process notice concerns have also played a noteworthy role
in recent cases implicating civil laws. In two cases decided in 2012,
both concerning administrative agencies, the Court has taken care to
stress the importance of notice. In the first, addressing the degree of
deference due to the Department of Labor in interpreting its rules,
294
the Court declined to extend Auer deference to that agency largely
295
because of considerations of “unfair surprise” to regulated parties.
The Court’s reasoning appears to make fair notice to regulated
parties a prerequisite for the extension of Auer deference to agency
296
interpretations of regulations. In the second case, which addressed
the Federal Communications Commission’s shifting efforts to
regulate indecency on television broadcasts, the Court stressed that
notice problems would be created by “regulatory change this abrupt
on any subject,” en route to holding that such change “surely” posed
297
a notice problem where protected speech might be chilled. Other
judgment would require holding the statute vague: “The Court strikes a pose of judicial
humility . . . . [But] it is wielding a power we long ago abjured: the power to define new federal
crimes.” Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2935 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia has long been a vocal
advocate for placing some teeth back into the vagueness doctrine. See, e.g., Sykes v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2288 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (chastising Congress for enacting an
“ever-increasing volume” of “imprecise laws”); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 255–
56 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (inviting a vagueness challenge to the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (1982 & Supp. V 1988)).
294. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) (holding that an agency’s interpretation
of an ambiguous regulation merits deference even when the interpretation is offered in a legal
brief, so long as it reflects the “agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in
question”).
295. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167–68 (2012) (“[T]he
pharmaceutical industry had little reason to suspect that its longstanding practice of treating
detailers as exempt outside salesmen transgressed the FLSA. The statute and regulations
certainly do not provide clear notice of this. . . . [W]here, as here, an agency’s announcement of
its interpretation is preceded by a very lengthy period of conspicuous inaction, the potential for
unfair surprise is acute.”). See generally Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole
Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1461–62 (2011) (noting the potential dangers of
deference to agencies that promulgate their own rules and interpret them with few safeguards).
296. See Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2167 (holding that deference to the agency’s
interpretation “would seriously undermine the principle that agencies should provide regulated
parties ‘fair warning of the conduct [a regulation] prohibits or requires’”) (alteration in original)
(quoting Gates & Fox Co. v. OSHA, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986))).
297. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2318 (2012) (emphasis added)
(“The Commission’s lack of notice to Fox and ABC that its interpretation had
changed . . . ‘fail[ed] to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is
prohibited.’ This would be true with respect to a regulatory change this abrupt on any subject,
but it is surely the case when applied to the regulations in question, regulations that touch upon
‘sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms’ . . . .”) (second alteration in original)
(citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008); and Baggett
v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964))).
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recent cases, such as Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer &
298
Ulrich LPA, likewise show the Justices debating the extent to which
notice values require protection from complex federal civil
299
regulations.
Now, a cynic might take the view, à la the mid-1930s critics of
300
judicial mistrust of legislatures noted in Part II,
that these
contemporary invocations of due process notice values are merely
driven by politics or ideology rather than by any deep-seated concern
over constitutional values. Certainly, at least some of the recent
opinions that most aggressively urge the importance of protecting
notice—for example, the dissents in Skilling and Jerman—were not
penned by jurists greatly enamored of the laws and regulations under
review in those cases. Prominent scholars have mapped how the
Court can use statutory construction and canons of interpretation to
301
manipulate substantive outcomes. It would be easy to dismiss these
opinions as mere cumulative evidence of the fact that constitutional
doctrines, particularly interpretive rules, are malleable instruments
that conservative courts can wield to curb disliked exercises of
regulatory power.
That view is certainly plausible. But it too sharply discounts the
demonstrable appeal across the ideological spectrum of the various

298. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605 (2010).
299. The dissent in Jerman urged reading a “mistake[] of law” defense into a provision
authorizing a defense to civil suits under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15
U.S.C. §§ 1962–1692p (2006), where the conduct violative of the act was the result of a “bona
fide error,” Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1629–30 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Citing the quantity and
complexity of federal consumer-protection legislation, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito,
argued that individuals who acted on good-faith interpretations of what the law required ought
not to be vulnerable to civil liability for their “technical violations.” Id. at 1631. This is an
argument that the rationale of the Murdock line of cases should be expanded to apply to the
context of civil liability. See id. at 1630 (“The FDCPA is but one of many federal laws that
Congress has enacted to protect consumers.”); id. (collecting statutes); id. at 1632 (citing “the
complexity of the FDCPA regime” and its implementing regulations); cf. United States v.
Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933) (exempting from liability those who fail to pay taxes because
of a good-faith misunderstanding of complex tax rules); see supra text accompanying notes 131–
135.
300. See supra notes 58, 198–201.
301. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV.
1509, 1512 n.9, 1542–47 (1998) (describing the “manipulable” nature of linguistic and text-based
canons); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 433 (2002) (“Through equitable doctrines, interpretive
canons, and other devices of statutory construction, the [Rehnquist] Court has conferred
protections [upon state and local governments] that would be difficult if not impossible to derive
directly from the Constitution.”).
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facets of due process notice doctrine. Consider, for example, the rule
of lenity. As described in Part II.C, the rule of lenity was formerly
decried as a proxy variable reflecting latent conservative judicial
hostility toward progressive legislation—as a tool for undercutting
positive law from the same toolbox as the rule that statutes in
302
derogation of the common law should be narrowly construed. But
today, no single antiregulatory political agenda appears to unite the
Justices who are inclined to reinvigorate judicial enforcement of the
303
304
rule of lenity. Of course, not everyone supports the rule of lenity,
but it would be odd to accuse those who do advocate its more
aggressive use of being closet Lochnerists.
A somewhat similar tale can be told about retroactivity. Though
historically a doctrine intimately linked to the idea of protection of
traditional property rights, retroactivity challenges now often emerge
in challenges to statutory and regulatory schemes that have nothing to
305
do with property rights—notably, in the immigration context. In
these cases, the liberal members of the Court, not just the
conservatives, have employed retroactivity doctrine—albeit only to
construe a statute as prospective, not to void it for impermissible
306
retroactivity. The point is only that, as with lenity, a doctrine that
was once reliably associated with a single political or ideological
valence in one context (the regulation of economic matters) attracts a
quite different set of supporters in another (the regulation of
302. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
303. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 513–14 (2008) (Scalia, Souter, Thomas
& Ginsburg, JJ.) (applying the rule of lenity to the federal money-laundering statute); id. at 524,
528 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (providing a different rationale for applying the
rule of lenity); see also Price, supra note 192, at 886 (explaining the two main rationales for
lenity, notice and legislative supremacy, and their flaws); The New Rule of Lenity, supra note 34,
at 2420 (analyzing the Rehnquist Court’s modified application of the rule of lenity).
304. See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 198–200 (1985) (finding that the rule of lenity is only used now to
provide outcomes that “seem right”); Kahan, supra note 191, at 396–425 (arguing against lenity
and the notion lenity should be prioritized over other means of interpretation).
305. See, e.g., Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1483 (2012) (deciding whether the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208,
div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 & 18 U.S.C.), is
applicable to a crime that occurred before the law became effective); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289, 292–93 (2001) (inquiring whether the IIRIRA was intended to apply retroactively to past
crimes).
306. Compare, e.g., Vartelas, 132 S. Ct. at 1484 (Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ.) (applying the presumption against retroactivity and construing the
statute to have prospective effect only), with id. at 1492 (Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ.) (arguing
that the statute was not retroactive).
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immigration and deportation). In short, the jurisprudence of due
process notice interacts in somewhat unpredictable ways with
307
ideology; notice, like politics, makes strange bedfellows.
Understanding this point might encourage one to approach
recent cases in which the Court has played with due process notice
with a less skeptical stance. Here is one possible take on these cases—
an angle that is a bit more charitable and perhaps also more
illuminating. The opinions just described emphasize the importance
of due process notice, but they also share another feature in common:
these cases involve confusing federal statutes and complex federal
regulatory schemes. A persistent element of current legal and policy
debate is the critique of federal “hyperlexis,” or the complaint that
there exist too many federal laws and regulations, both civil and
308
criminal. Not too difficult to perceive in these recent cases is a more
fundamental and genuine strain of resistance to the statutory and
regulatory complexity that characterizes federal law today, as well as
a degree of sympathy with the regulated individual who, in plowing a
path through the legal thicket, unwittingly crosses some forbidden
line. Vagueness, retroactivity, and lenity offer a tempting array of
tools for curbing the modern-day bêtes noirs of federal
“overregulation” or “overcriminalization.” Put differently, in today’s
mature administrative state, emphasis on due process notice is not so
much a reliable stalking horse for conservative ideology, but rather
for a more widely shared concern that courts have made too sharp a
retreat from policing constitutional constraints on various kinds of
legislative and executive action affecting individuals and businesses.
Whatever one’s views on the judicial motives behind these
opinions, however, the recent rumblings around due process notice
may be safely read to reflect pressure building against the New Deal
reformulation of due process notice doctrine. These cases increase the
odds that the New Deal reformulation of due process notice doctrine
was not a fundamental part of what the New Deal “settled,” or settled
permanently. They also pose a normative question that merits a

307. Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 64
(2012) (“Across a broad range of cases, the Court expressed a suspicion of the political
process—a suspicion that goes beyond skepticism toward the traditional Carolene Products
categories . . . . And while the distrust was expressed more often by the more conservative
members of the Court, it was not limited to them.”).
308. See Mila Sohoni, The Idea of “Too Much Law,” 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1587
(2012) (describing variants of “the claim that America suffers from ‘hyperlexis,’ or the existence
of ‘too much law,’” and its influence on governmental actors).
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response: Is the New Deal reformulation of due process notice
doctrine maladapted to the modern regulatory state?
Certainly, reasons for rethinking the lines drawn by the New
Deal reformulation of due process notice jurisprudence are not hard
to adduce. Statutes and regulations are far more extensive now than
309
they were in that era, and they probably affect the behavior of
310
individuals as well as businesses to a greater extent now. Businesses,
much less individuals, are often unable to consult with regulators to
311
determine in advance how the law may apply to them. Civil
regulations often impose consequences that are as severe in some
312
respects as criminal sanctions, a fact that undermines somewhat the
rationale for differential scrutiny of these categories for vagueness
purposes. The existence of mens rea requirements has not saved
individuals from criminal convictions for conduct that it would be
hard to suspect was civilly sanctioned, let alone criminally
313
punishable. A prima facie case can easily be made, then, that the

309. APA at 65: Is Reform Needed To Create Jobs, Promote Economic Growth, and Reduce
Costs?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial, & Admin. Law of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 12 fig.2 (2011) (statement of Susan Dudley, Director, George
Washington University Regulatory Studies Center) (describing the increase in the number of
pages in the Federal Register from 1940 to 2010); Robert C. Ellickson, Taming Leviathan: Will
the Centralizing Tide of the Twentieth Century Continue into the Twenty-First?, 74 S. CAL. L.
REV. 101, 105 (2000) (“In 1928, the unannotated version of the United States Code appeared in
two tall volumes that totaled six inches in width. The 1988 version of the unannotated Code
included twenty-nine volumes that spanned six feet, a twelve-fold increase.” (footnote
omitted)).
310. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 409 (1989) (describing the continuing post-New Deal growth of the regulatory state during
the “rights revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s, when the “national government substantially
increased its regulatory responsibilities”).
311. See, e.g., Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1628,
1635 (2010) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the notion that “an attorney faced with legal
uncertainty only needs to turn to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for an advisory
opinion” as “misconceiv[ing] the practical realities of litigation” and concluding that this may
partly account for “why, in the past decade, the FTC has issued only four opinions in response
to just seven requests”).
312. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1534 (1996) (“[S]ome justification for corporate criminal liability may have
existed in the past, when civil enforcement techniques were not well developed, but from a
deterrence perspective, very little now supports the continued imposition of criminal rather than
civil liability on corporations. Indeed, the answer to the question the title poses—‘corporate
criminal liability: what purpose does it serve?’—is ‘almost none.’”).
313. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 702 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (“This case is novel: The Government has obtained a false statements conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 against an individual who signed the wrong name on a postal delivery
form.”).
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due process notice doctrine crafted in the New Deal era is
maladapted to the shape and operation of the mature regulatory
state.
When a system’s premises “cease[] to be persuasive descriptive
accounts of the world,” it is time to “reassess and revise those
314
premises.” It lies beyond the scope of this Article to perform a
normative assessment of whether and how due process notice
doctrine requires renovation in view of the statutory and regulatory
complexity of modern-day American law. But without understanding
the due process notice doctrine of the past, it is impossible to sketch
the due process notice doctrine that society may want and need for
the future. This Article has laid some necessary groundwork for that
normative analysis.
CONCLUSION
John Pierpont Morgan is generally known as a financier, not a
legal philosopher. He lived his life during the ascendancy of Lochner,
315
at the zenith of the doctrine of liberty of contract. And Morgan was
speaking of people, not of courts, when he observed that a man
generally has two reasons for doing something: a good reason and the
316
real reason. Still, it is hard to formulate a pithier summary of legal
317
realism’s view of how courts reason.
The story of due process notice doctrine vividly illustrates how
effectively good reasons can mask real reasons. The shifts in due
process notice doctrine described in this Article mostly occurred with
little fanfare, in the course of the Court’s adjudication of
constitutional and statutory cases across a wide and variegated legal
terrain. The Court routinely packaged its reasons for rejecting a
notice challenge, or for altering its interpretive techniques relevant to
notice, as just an unobjectionable application of past precedents to
new facts.
With a little digging, however, it becomes evident that during this
period the Court was engaged in refashioning due process notice

314. Cushman, supra note 227, at 258.
315. See JEAN STROUSE, MORGAN: AMERICAN FINANCIER, at ix (2000) (“When Pierpont
Morgan died in 1913 . . . he was the most powerful banker in the world.”).
316. Id. at xiii.
317. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1237
(1931) (describing legal realism as involving “distrust of the theory that traditional prescriptive
rule-formulations are the heavily operative factor in producing court decisions”).
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doctrine to allow a wide judicial berth to the regulatory state. In this
newly emerging constitutional regime, aggressive judicial review of
matters of notice came to seem as unwelcome and as abnormal as
aggressive judicial review of substantive policy questions. Hidden in
plain view, the New Deal constitutionalism of due process notice
encapsulates how the Court adapted the demands of rule-of-law
values and the institution of judicial review to the changing
318
constitutional and political convictions of American society.
Thus reformulated, due process notice doctrine served an
important purpose. Within the relaxed constraints of due process
notice jurisprudence, Congress, state legislatures, and federal and
state agencies have for seventy-five years wielded a largely free hand,
at least from the standpoint of due process notice questions, in
drafting the civil and criminal laws and regulations that would govern
modern America in all its complexity.
But this relaxation may have stretched the doctrine to the
snapping point. When modern judges survey the resultant morass of
federal laws and regulations, some now perceive a threat to the fragile
virtues of constitutionally adequate notice. These judges have once
again started to toy with the idea of using due process notice doctrine
as a tool for restraining legislation and regulation.
To be sure, judicial opinions invoking concepts of due process
notice are few and far between. But, now and then, and perhaps with
increasing assuredness, such opinions do come down. Though they
make little splash, they strike the ear like the first few drops of a
heavier rainfall. Before that rain starts in earnest, public law scholars
must engage with the questions of whether and how due process
notice doctrine should be adapted to respond to the demands of
today’s regulatory state.

318. See Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003) (“[C]onstitutional law and culture are locked in a
dialectical relationship, so that constitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates
culture”).

